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ABSTRACT
The burgeoning commentary on democratic decline in the United
States focuses disproportionately on the national level. And seeing a
national problem, reformers understandably seek to bolster democracy
through large-scale federal solutions. Although their efforts hold
popular appeal, they face strong institutional headwinds. As scholars
have extensively documented, the Senate, the Electoral College, and the
Supreme Court today are skewed against majority rule. Despair grows.
This Article urges legal scholars and reformers to turn their gaze to
state-level institutions. State institutions, the Article shows, offer
democratic opportunity that federal institutions do not. By design, they
more readily give popular majorities a chance to rule on equal terms.
Utilizing these opportunities can help stave off democratic decline in
the short term and build a healthier democracy in the long term. But
these opportunities are not guarantees, and they are in danger. State
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majoritarian institutions today face active threats from antidemocratic
forces. These attacks—on state courts, ballot initiatives, and elected
executives—have largely flown under the radar or been noticed only in
isolation. Their proponents, moreover, have sought to disguise them as
good-governance reforms, exploiting the muddled dialogue
surrounding democracy generally.
After highlighting the vital role of state institutions in American
democracy, the Article provides a holistic account of the attacks they
face today. It then offers a theoretical framework for distinguishing
appropriate constraints on popular majorities from those that should
be out of bounds—because, for example, they would install minorityparty rule. The Article suggests steps that state courts, state officials, and
organizers can take to protect state institutions. At the highest level, it
shows how a richer theory and discourse surrounding state institutions
can advance both state and national democracy.
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INTRODUCTION
It is a sign of the times that fear of democratic decline now
occupies a prominent place in both the academic literature1 and
popular commentary in the United States.2 Commentators identify
antidemocratic actions from voter suppression to partisan
gerrymandering to a frighteningly fraught transfer of power following
the 2020 presidential election.3 They point to “warning flags”4 of

1. See generally, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Foreword: The Degradation of American
Democracy—and the Court, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (2020) [hereinafter Klarman, Foreword]
(cataloguing “the recent degradation of American democracy” and explaining the Supreme
Court’s contribution to that degradation); STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW
DEMOCRACIES DIE (2018) (drawing from comparative examples of democratic breakdown and
arguing that American democracy is in danger); TOM GINSBURG & AZIZ Z. HUQ, HOW TO SAVE
A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (2019) (describing reasons to be concerned about democratic
decline and exploring law’s potential and limits in helping to preserve democracy).
2. For examples of this theme turning up in the television, print, and digital news, see Judy
Woodruff & Barton Gellman, How a ‘Mass Movement’ Based on Election Lies Is Threatening
American Democracy, PBS NEWSHOUR (Dec. 9, 2021, 6:45 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/
show/how-a-mass-movement-based-on-election-lies-is-threatening-american-democracy [https://
perma.cc/5MNY-MR2L]; Karen Morfitt, ‘Pay Attention’: Colorado Political Experts Reflect on
Storming the Capitol Building, CBS DENV. (Jan. 6, 2021, 10:00 PM), https://denver.cbslocal.com/
2021/01/06/colorado-protests-capitol-building [https://perma.cc/9D5G-9NKW]; Zeb Larson, Attack
on the U.S. Capitol Sets a Precedent for Future Anti-Government Action, TEEN VOGUE (Jan. 8,
2021), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/trump-revolt-capitol-history-anti-government-violence
[https://perma.cc/9A6S-RWCD]; Miriam Berger, U.S. Listed as a ‘Backsliding’ Democracy for
First Time in Report by European Think Tank, WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 2021, 11:18 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/11/22/united-states-backsliding-democracies-list-fir
st-time [https://perma.cc/F247-S95V]; Berry Craig, Two Kentucky Historians Agree the GOP Is
Steering the US Straight Toward Authoritarianism, COURIER J. (Dec. 30, 2021, 1:59 PM),
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/opinion/2021/12/29/gop-steering-us-toward-authoritariani
sm-historians-say-opinion/9032068002 [https://perma.cc/U52D-RU4Y].
3. See supra note 1.
4. See, e.g., PIPPA NORRIS, ELECTORAL INTEGRITY IN THE 2020 U.S. ELECTIONS 5 (2020),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58533f31bebafbe99c85dc9b/t/604784f8451f52636f8315bb/1
615299838676/PEI-US-2020+Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/FN2Y-GB9K] (describing “warning
flags”); INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, THE GLOBAL STATE OF
DEMOCRACY 2021, at iii, 1, 5–6 (2021) (studying global democratic erosion and finding that the
United States was “knocked down a significant number of steps on the democratic scale”).
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democracy’s erosion and the specter of authoritarianism5 or minority
rule.6 And they ask: “Can it happen here?”7 Is it happening already?8
In moments of optimism, scholars and pollsters remind us that
national majorities strongly support democracy. Majorities oppose
authoritarianism, favor competitive elections, and support a
multiracial society.9 In spite of deep partisan animosity,10 national

5. See, e.g., Barton Gellman, Trump’s Next Coup Has Already Begun, ATLANTIC (Dec. 9,
2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/01/january-6-insurrection-trump-coup
-2024-election/620843 [https://perma.cc/8ZCS-R3RU].
6. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Why the US Is a Failed Democratic State, N.Y. REV. BOOKS
(Dec. 10, 2021), https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2021/12/10/why-the-us-is-a-failed-democratic-sta
te [https://perma.cc/6J5J-3P35].
7. See generally, e.g., CAN IT HAPPEN HERE? AUTHORITARIANISM IN AMERICA (Cass R.
Sunstein ed., 2018) (collecting essays discussing past, present, and future authoritarianism in the
United States).
8. See generally, e.g., Gellman, supra note 5; Risa Brooks & Erica De Bruin, 18 Steps to a
Democratic Breakdown, WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/
interactive/2021/january-6-next-coup-signs [https://perma.cc/H5WZ-M62C] (evaluating indicators
of democratic backsliding in the United States); Richard L. Hasen, Identifying and Minimizing
the Risk of Election Subversion and Stolen Elections in the Contemporary United States, 135
HARV. L. REV. F. 265 (2022) (outlining steps to limit the risk of election subversion).
9. See Steven Levitsky, Richard Albert, Miriam Seifter & Tom Ginsburg, The Third
Founding: The Rise of Multiracial Democracy and the Authoritarian Reaction Against It, CALIF.
L. REV., at 10:56 (Nov. 4, 2021), https://www.californialawreview.org/event/2021-jorde-sym
posium-the-third-founding-the-rise-of-multiracial-democracy-and-the-authoritarian-reaction-ag
ainst-it [https://perma.cc/9LPE-FZ5Y]. In making this observation, I do not mean to undermine
the extent to which the nation has fractured into different epistemic communities, such that the
two parties perceive different threats to democracy. See Domenico Montanaro, Most Americans
Trust Elections Are Fair, but Sharp Divides Exist, a New Poll Finds, NPR (Nov. 1, 2021),
https://www.npr.org/2021/11/01/1050291610/most-americans-trust-elections-are-fair-but-sharp-di
vides-exist-a-new-poll-finds [https://perma.cc/Y3MP-5J95]. Nor do I discount the risk that over
time, dysfunctional government makes autocrats more attractive to the public. See Richard H.
Pildes, Political Fragmentation in Democracies of the West 4 (N.Y.U. Pub. L. & Legal Theory
Rsch. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 21-50, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3935012 [https://
perma.cc/M74F-P22G]. Still, there appears to be sufficient common ground on fundamentals to
believe that the will of the people still favors democracy rather than autocracy and that there are
opportunities to leverage common sensibilities. See, e.g., ROBERT BOSCH STIFTUNG & MORE IN
COMMON, IT’S COMPLICATED: PEOPLE AND THEIR DEMOCRACY IN GERMANY, FRANCE,
BRITAIN, POLAND, AND THE UNITED STATES 4, 10 (2021), https://www.moreincommon.com/me
dia/qupjbcx1/more-in-common-bosch-democracy-executive-summary-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/
VL9F-3CWD].
10. See FRANCES E. LEE, INSECURE MAJORITIES: CONGRESS AND THE PERPETUAL
CAMPAIGN 5 (2016) (observing that close competition between the parties incentivizes “the sharp
and contentious partisanship that is characteristic of contemporary American politics”). See
generally LILLIANA MASON, UNCIVIL AGREEMENT: HOW POLITICS BECAME OUR IDENTITY
(2018) (describing animosity and distrust between Democrats and Republicans).
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majorities also support a wide range of seemingly common-sense
policies that could indirectly strengthen democracy by lessening
inequality or fostering basic government competence.11 Majorities,
then, might be a vital lifeline for democracy. Important calls urge them
to mobilize.12 But where can they rule?
Not, it seems, at the national level, where “[w]e are trapped by our
institutions.”13 Prominent scholars of law, political science, and history
have long recognized that the federal constitution is not very
democratic.14 Rule by the people faces formidable constitutional
headwinds, including the structure of the Senate, Electoral College,
and federal courts, as well as the difficulty of amending the founding
document itself.15 Today’s politics and geography make the problem
worse. In an era of political and geographic polarization, our national
institutions can yield consistent minority-party control.16 And, scholars
warn, the move toward antidemocratic tactics in some wings of the

11. See, e.g., Will Friedman & David Schleifer, Hidden Common Ground: Why Americans
Aren’t As Divided on Issues As We Appear To Be, USA TODAY (Apr. 27, 2021, 5:01 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2021/04/27/case-unity-americans-arent-divided-issuesappears-column/7190411002 [https://perma.cc/3FN9-9QMD] (describing polling reflecting strong
cross-party support on a range of policies, including “raising the minimum wage, investing in
infrastructure to create jobs, creating a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants who
arrived in the U.S. as children,” as well as regulating social media to decrease partisan animosity
and improving economic opportunity for all).
12. See, e.g., Nikolas Bowie, Antidemocracy, 135 HARV. L. REV. 160, 163 (2021); Kate
Andrias & Benjamin I. Sachs, Constructing Countervailing Power: Law and Organizing in an Era
of Political Inequality, 130 YALE L.J. 546, 567 (2021); DAVID DALEY, UNRIGGED: HOW
AMERICANS ARE BATTLING BACK TO SAVE DEMOCRACY 238–40 (2020).
13. Levitsky et al., supra note 9, at 43:47.
14. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 6, 9 (2006); ROBERT
A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 15–20 (2d ed. 2003)
[hereinafter DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC]; Joyce Appleby, The American Heritage: The Heirs and
the Disinherited, 74 J. AM. HIST. 798, 804 (1987).
15. See also David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, The Original Theory of
Constitutionalism, 127 YALE L.J. 664, 687 (2018) (reviewing RICHARD TUCK, THE SLEEPING
SOVEREIGN (2016)) (discussing the difficulty of amending the U.S. Constitution). See generally
LEVINSON, supra note 14 (arguing that the Constitution is insufficiently democratic).
16. See generally Laura Bronner & Nathaniel Rakich, Advantage, GOP: Why Democrats
Have To Win Large Majorities To Govern While Republicans Don’t Need Majorities at All,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 29, 2021), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/advantage-gop [https://
perma.cc/8XHB-C9NP] (analyzing the phenomenon from a political science perspective);
Jonathan S. Gould & David E. Pozen, Structural Biases in Structural Constitutional Law, 97
N.Y.U. L. REV. 59 (2022) (analyzing the phenomenon from a legal perspective).
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Republican Party threatens to entrench minority rule for the long term
in all three national branches.17
Majorities stand a greater chance in the states. This Article argues
that state institutions offer crucial democratic opportunity that federal
institutions thwart: the opportunity for popular majorities to rule on
equal terms.18 These state institutions—including state governors,
ballot initiatives, state courts, and sometimes state legislatures—are
majoritarian in structure and thus preserve space for democratic
decision-making. What is more, they offer democratic opportunity in a
broader sense. They can provide vital counterweights to national
minoritarian domination and, in turn, buoy the prospect of American
democracy’s survival. Neither majority rule nor pro-democracy
policies are guaranteed in these state institutions, for reasons this
Article details. But within state institutions, determined majorities,
shut out elsewhere, have an opening.
Once we see state institutions as the remaining outposts of
majority rule, another development becomes unsurprising: these state
institutions are under attack. Through hundreds of bills, state
legislatures have impeded the ballot initiative process or attempted to
do so.19 A similar blizzard of legislation has stripped power from
popularly elected governors to respond to emergencies and oversee
other functions, including election administration.20 A number of states
are seeking to limit the role of statewide majorities in electing state
judges.21 Like so many state-level actions, these developments have

17. See, e.g., Sean Wilentz, The Tyranny of the Minority, from Calhoun to Trump, 2
LIBERTIES (2021), https://libertiesjournal.com/articles/the-tyranny-of-the-minority-from-calhoun
-to-trump [https://perma.cc/3B8S-2MX5]; Levitsky et al., supra note 9, at 12:14.
18. I explain the Article’s definition of democracy and majority rule further in Part I. The
concept of democratic opportunity this Article advances overlaps with the social science concept
of “political opportunity,” but with a particular focus on the institutional prospects for democratic
rule. See Peter K. Eisinger, The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities, 67 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 11, 25 (1973) (using the term “political opportunity structure” to refer to “the degree
to which groups are likely to be able to gain access to power and to manipulate the political
system”); William A. Gamson & David S. Meyer, Framing Political Opportunity, in
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 275, 276 (Doug McAdam, John D.
McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald eds., 1996) (arguing for a more robust concept of political opportunity
that allows for the recognition of opportunities “even in the absence of a challenging movement”).
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part II.
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tended to fly under the radar.22 When they have been noticed,
commentary considers them only in isolation.23
These recent efforts to hamstring majoritarian institutions should
instead be viewed as parts of a whole. Collectively, they threaten
American democracy by kneecapping key bastions of popular majority
rule. This Article offers these insights in service of intertwined goals of
theory and reform. Changing the way we conceive of the state role in
American democracy might direct us to productive solutions before the
light goes out.
First, this Article’s exploration of state democratic opportunity
requires reimagining the interplay of democracy and federalism. To
date, pro-democracy reformers have focused most of their attention on
the national level. That is understandable; federal statutes foreclosing
congressional gerrymandering and mandating fairer and more
inclusive elections could be game-changing, even as their near-term
prospects appear remote. And the states may seem an unlikely place
to find help. Prevailing theories paint states as spaces for elevating and
protecting national minority populations or outgroups, not providing a
pathway for national majorities.24 More practically, any turn to states
must grapple with states’ association with ineffectiveness or a lack of
transparency,25 with the history and threat of “subnational
and
with
some
state
legislatures’
authoritarianism,”26
22. On inattention to state institutions, see, for example, Miriam Seifter, Further from the
People? The Puzzle of State Administration, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 107, 146 (2018); David Schleicher,
Federalism and State Democracy, 95 TEX. L. REV. 763, 777 (2017).
23. See infra Part II.
24. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4
(2010) [hereinafter Gerken, Federalism] (“Federalism is a system that permits minorities to rule,
and we are intimately familiar with its benefits: federalism promotes choice, competition,
participation, experimentation, and the diffusion of power.”); Daryl J. Levinson, Foreword:
Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 106 (2016) (“Only certain kinds of
groups—national minorities that can form state majorities—can conceivably benefit from
decentralization.”).
25. For a description of the longstanding view of state government as useless or
incompetent, see generally JON C. TEAFORD, THE RISE OF THE STATES (2002) (critiquing this
view). For a more recent exploration, see Justin Weinstein-Tull, State Bureaucratic Undermining,
85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083, 1108–25 (2018).
26. EDWARD L. GIBSON, BOUNDARY CONTROL: SUBNATIONAL AUTHORITARIANISM IN
FEDERAL DEMOCRACIES 39 (2013) (describing “the rise and maintenance of state-level
authoritarian regimes in the American South in the 19th and 20th centuries”); Johanna Kalb &
Didi Kuo, Reassessing American Democracy: The Enduring Challenge of Racial Exclusion, 117
MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 57 (2018) (“Democrats were given free rein to establish authoritarianism
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countermajoritarian status.27 Given all this, it is easy to ignore state
institutions when racing to preserve a functional democracy.
But if conventional accounts count states out, they mistake
addressable issues for hard-wired ones. States do not offer democratic
perfection, but they do present an opportunity for a constitutional and
institutional regime in which determined popular majorities can prevail
if they mobilize. Indeed, this Article’s institutional framework aligns
with and helps explain the many works of law and policy suggesting
that popular movements do or should begin with a state or local
foothold.28 Of course, states alone cannot be a complete answer to our
present ills. But letting them, too, slip into minority rule will greatly
exacerbate our problems. Like the distant collapsing ice shelves that
signal climate catastrophe, cascading degradations of state-level
democracy are both late-stage symptoms of democratic decline and
drivers of its most potent consequences.
Second, at the same time that we put greater stock in state
democratic opportunity, we should develop a discourse that can make
better sense of both the necessity and limits of majority rule, in the
states and beyond. To date, efforts to protect democracy have yielded
a muddled public dialogue. The proponents of antidemocratic
measures in the states sometimes argue they are improving democracy
itself.29 Other times, they warn of the downsides of majority rule
(offering the “republic, not a democracy” refrain30), even when pushing

in the southern states by eliminating political competition and instituting racial segregation.”).
See generally Jacob M. Grumbach, Laboratories of Democratic Backsliding (June 5, 2022)
(unpublished manuscript), https://www.dropbox.com/s/c682q88keqycp6s/grumbach_laboratories
_of_democratic_backsliding.pdf [https://perma.cc/L56X-W6Y5] (quantifying contemporary state-level
democratic backsliding and finding that it correlated with Republican control of state
government).
27. Miriam Seifter, Countermajoritarian Legislatures, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 1733, 1735 (2021)
[hereinafter Seifter, Countermajoritarian Legislatures].
28. See infra Part I.B.
29. LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 1, at 92 (“One of the great ironies of how democracies
die is that the very defense of democracy is often used as a pretext for its subversion.”).
30. See JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, LET THEM EAT TWEETS 177 (2020)
(discussing the recent rise of the “democracy/republic slogan” and noting that “those who invoke
it are not, as a rule, making the reasonable argument that the rights of vulnerable minorities
should be protected or that some decisions should require supermajorities”; rather, “[t]hey are
arguing that democracy itself is a problem, because it threatens the property and power of
powerful minorities”).
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measures that would harm rather than help minority interests.31 But
democracy is not a river that can float every boat, and this Article takes
seriously the risk that muddled dialogue leads to opportunism.32 The
competition to convey ideas to the public, the media, and officials
themselves, a task at which the political right has been especially
effective in recent decades,33 is important to any movement to preserve
state democracy.
To this end, the Article aims to dispel the insinuation that state
majoritarian institutions threaten distinctive harm. The harms
associated with majority power—most commonly, harms that subvert
political equality—are real. But they are the problems of power,
period. They are just as likely to flow from outsized minority rule, at
much greater cost to democracy. To cut through the noise, the Article
offers a simple normative framework, which it terms structural
tailoring, to evaluate types of majority constraint.34 A host of “weak”
constraints on state majoritarian institutions may enrich decisionmaking, but “strong” constraints should be rejected absent adequate

31. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Miriam Seifter, The Democracy Principle in State
Constitutions, 119 MICH. L. REV. 859, 862 (2021).
32. This Article is thus rooted in the cross-disciplinary literatures about how framing and
rhetoric shape both public opinion and constitutional interpretation. For just a few examples, see
DANIEL T. RODGERS, CONTESTED TRUTHS: KEYWORDS IN AMERICAN POLITICS SINCE
INDEPENDENCE 4–8 (1987); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and
Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1419 (2006); Lani
Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence of Law and Social
Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740, 2749 (2014); Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J.
657, 702–03 (2009); Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements, 111
MICH. L. REV. 877, 879 (2013); Lauren B. Edelman, Gwendolyn Leachman & Doug McAdam,
On Law, Organizations, and Social Movements, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 653, 664–65 (2010).
On the recent blurring of democracy discourse in particular, see LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra
note 1, at 92; HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 30.
33. See STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT 2 (2008);
AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKY, IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES: THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY AND THE
CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION, at ch. 1 (2015); Greene, supra note 32, at 708–14
(explaining the appeal of originalism to popular audiences); cf. David E. Pozen, Eric L. Talley &
Julian Nyarko, A Computational Analysis of Constitutional Polarization, 105 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 5 (2019) (“[W]e demonstrate that conservatives in recent Congresses have developed an
especially coherent constitutional vocabulary, with which they have come to ‘own’ not only terms
associated with originalism and the Framers but also terms associated with textual provisions such
as the First Amendment.”).
34. Structural tailoring—the idea that, like rights incursions, structural incursions may raise
distinctive normative concerns and thus warrant variegated scrutiny—has broader implications
than those I discuss here, as I will address in future work.
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justification. With this in mind, the Article identifies three recurring
mistakes that state-level changes make. Each would systematically
replace majority with minority rule or cause the harms to political
equality that they purport to ease. The Article does not purport to
perfect the famously “tricky task,” as Professor John Hart Ely wrote,35
of balancing minority and majority power. Still, it is both possible and
imperative to identify some actions as out of bounds—to distinguish
antidemocratic attacks from salutary reform efforts.
All of this should give us a refreshed lens on where majorities can
rule, how democracy might still flourish here, and what we should do
now. Pouring energy into state democratic institutions is time well
spent today. There is no easy fix, but important interventions are
available. The Article focuses on four change-makers who can invest
in and reinforce state-level democracy. First, state courts play an
important role. Courts can apply the state constitutional democracy
principle to limit baseless attacks on state majoritarian institutions, as
a few recent decisions illustrate. Second, reformers in state government
who have legitimate concerns about direct democracy, gubernatorial
power, or elected courts (for example, a legislature that believes the
governor went too far in imposing COVID-19-related measures) can
proceed incrementally rather than overhauling the institutions,
recognizing the important function that majoritarian state institutions
serve. Third, organizers can use a vocabulary of democracy—rather
than more isolated, case-specific pleas—to frame and mobilize action
against state actions that undermine state institutions for
antidemocratic purposes. Finally, everyone who values democracy
should invest in it offensively in the states, not just defensively, by
viewing elections for state majoritarian actors as enormously
important, not minor or optional (or uncontested) affairs; by investing
in the expertise and capacity of state institutions; and by promoting
civic engagement and deliberation on state, not just national, affairs.
The remainder of the Article unfolds in four parts. Part I tells two
tales of democratic opportunity, contrasting the obstacles to majority
rule at the national level with the meaningful pathways for it in the
states. Part II describes the emerging threats to state majoritarian
institutions, which are often marketed as good-government reforms.
Part III seeks to make sense of these developments through a rough
normative framework of structural tailoring. Under the framework’s
35.

JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 7–8 (1980).
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tailoring principle, strong constraints require scrutiny and must stop
short of subverting majority rule at an institution-wide level. Many of
Part II’s developments fail under this framework. Finally, Part IV
proposes interventions that can safeguard state majoritarian
institutions and, in turn, keep a foot in the closing door of American
democracy.
One note before proceeding. Whereas a system that deploys
institutional counterweights to protect minority groups against
majority rule may well approximate a first-best political order, a system
that offers only limited, subnational opportunity to protect majorities
from minority rule is almost certainly not. The Article does not suggest
that preserving state majoritarian institutions yields an optimal result;
the interventions here are more last resort than gold standard. But that
makes the problems discussed here all the more urgent.
I. TWO TALES OF DEMOCRATIC OPPORTUNITY
Something is missing in the burgeoning commentary on our
nation’s democratic headwinds. Scholars have rightly pointed out that
the Senate, the Electoral College, and the Supreme Court are skewed
against majority rule. But we seldom hear much about the states.
Commentators are understandably focused on the largest trees in the
forest but are missing the vital undergrowth.
This Part urges zooming out. It invites a reimagination of
American democracy as a landscape made up of both federal and state
institutions that offer different democratic opportunity. It is true that
national institutions are impeding majority rule today, as Part I.A
describes below. Determined majorities—that is, those who organize
and mobilize to seek political change—can try their best at the national
level, and often do. But because of the way that institutional structure
interacts with polarization and political geography, they will tend to fail
absent supermajority support.
The script is flipped in the states. State constitutions yield three
purely majoritarian institutions: elected state executives, elected state
courts, and ballot initiatives. State legislatures, for their part, may also
(but not always) be majoritarian. None of these institutions will always
yield majoritarian results. But the constitutional opportunity they offer
to determined majorities is qualitatively different from those
opportunities at the national level. Determined majorities at the state
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level can win. If the question is, Where can majorities rule?, the answer
is subnational.
Before proceeding, each component of democratic opportunity
warrants explanation. By democratic, I refer to an institution in which
popular majorities rule, with individuals participating on equal terms.
This definition encompasses three defining pillars of democracy:
majority rule, popular sovereignty, and political equality. As Professor
Jessica Bulman-Pozen and I have argued elsewhere, these aspects of
democracy are both normatively desirable and widely shared,36 even as
democracy is an “exemplary essentially contested concept.”37
The Article pays special attention to the democratic pillar of
majority rule—a basic threshold for democracy that recent
developments threaten. Measuring majority rule faces well-known
conceptual and practical challenges,38 but this Article adopts a minimal
definition that should hold broad appeal. For this Article’s purposes,
an institution establishes a threshold of majoritarianism when the
candidate or party (or position, for ballot initiatives) with the most
voter support prevails.39 This thin definition may not go far enough.
When participation in the political community is restricted or
suppressed, we cannot speak meaningfully of rule by the majority.40
Building more inclusive political communities must therefore be a vital
and continuing state project. In addition, defining majoritarianism
based on institutional structure is less demanding than seeking

36. See Bulman-Pozen & Seifter, supra note 31, at 864.
37. Id.
38. See generally, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (3d
ed. 2012) (positing the impossibility of aggregating collective preferences while also complying
with basic fairness requirements).
39. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, at ch. 10 (1989) (justifying a
majority rule-based definition of democracy); see also Seifter, Countermajoritarian Legislatures,
supra note 27, at 1736–37 (“[M]ost minimally under majority rule, the candidate or party that
receives the most votes should win.”).
40. See generally ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY
OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 2009) (recounting the history of suffrage,
voting rights, and ballot access in the United States); GIBSON, supra note 26 (undertaking a
comparative analysis of subnational authoritarianism, including in the U.S. South); ROBERT
MICKEY, PATHS OUT OF DIXIE (2015) (arguing that states in the U.S. South amounted to
authoritarian enclaves until the early 1970s and describing their eventual democratization).
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congruence41 or alignment42 at the level of individual or aggregate
policy-making.43 But the definition at least provides a baseline for
assessment—an important starting point given that state constitutions,
unlike the federal constitution, “locate the majority of the political
community as the principal and normatively superior
decisionmaker.”44
Furthermore, when discussing majority rule, this Article focuses
on the political system, and it primarily addresses majority and
minority parties. A broader and longer-term project might consider
effects of institutional structure on other majority and minority
populations or interests. But at both the state and national levels,
partisanship is the most salient variable in both policy-making and
political discourse,45 and indeed, partisan divisions today often track
other divisions.46 Moreover, scholars have shown that national
partisanship affiliations now animate state-level voting47—a
phenomenon that discourages federalism scholars seeking distinctive
state-level political communities but that also renders states a plausible
site for the mobilization of national majorities. In some instances,
especially in the context of ballot initiatives, the Article also discusses
a majority-minority policy dynamic, one in which cross-party voters
form a majority on a given issue, but elected leaders stymie them or
push unpopular policies instead.
And what of opportunity? As I use the term, a democratic
opportunity exists when a determined majority has a reasonable
chance of prevailing, even if their success is not a foregone conclusion

41. See Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, The Democratic Deficit in the States, 56 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 148, 152–53 (2012) (identifying gaps in congruence at the state level).
42. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 283, 287
(2014).
43. On the “trustee” versus “delegate” theories of representation, see, for example, Andrew
Rehfeld, Representation Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates, and Gyroscopes in the Study of
Political Representation and Democracy, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 214, 219 (2009).
44. Bulman-Pozen & Seifter, supra note 31, at 899.
45. See infra notes 48–51; Gould & Pozen, supra note 16, at 67 (“[P]arties are the key
institutions that organize political contestation [in the United States].”).
46. See Gould & Pozen, supra note 16, at 67 (“[M]any social identities are now subsumed
into party identities, and many demographic and interest groups are now firmly ensconced in
either the Democratic or Republican coalition.”).
47. See DANIEL J. HOPKINS, THE INCREASINGLY UNITED STATES: HOW AND WHY
AMERICAN POLITICAL BEHAVIOR NATIONALIZED 36–58 (2018).
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and may require threshold changes in rules or circumstances. Thus,
democratic opportunity refers to outcomes that are neither a fantasy
nor a guarantee. As I explain more below, sometimes an opportunity
is absent because it is foreclosed by the constitution’s structure; federal
judges are not elected, for example. Other times an opportunity is
absent due to durable political or social forces. In particular, the nation
today is politically divided,48 highly polarized,49 ideologically sorted,50
and unevenly distributed geographically,51 and that takes certain
national political outcomes off the table. Those features seem unlikely
to change in the foreseeable future.52 On the flip side, outcomes are a
guarantee when their success is a lock. The point here is not to suggest
any such guarantee, but to stress that majorities can prevail in the
states—and change can happen—in ways that are structurally barred
or politically off the table at the national level.53
In turn, as this Part explains, victories for state-level majorities can
advance national democracy in two ways: by forestalling or preventing
the spread of national democratic decline (the “fingers in the dam”
model) and by boosting pro-democratic movements and initiatives to
more states and into national focus (the “springboard” model).

48. See LEE, supra note 10.
49. For accounts of modern polarization, see, for example, MASON, supra note 10; NOLAN
MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA 1–14 (2006)
(describing the rise of polarization and its relationship to other economic and social changes).
50. See generally, e.g., ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE GREAT ALIGNMENT: RACE, PARTY
TRANSFORMATION, AND THE RISE OF DONALD TRUMP (2018) (discussing the growing alignment
of different groups from dramatic changes since the end of World War II).
51. See JONATHAN A. RODDEN, WHY CITIES LOSE: THE DEEP ROOTS OF THE URBANRURAL POLITICAL DIVIDE 23 (2019).
52. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of
Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 288 (2011) (“[T]he hyperpolarization
of the last generation should be understood as the steady state of American democracy, or the
manifestation of a more mature American democracy, and hence likely to be enduring.”).
53. The concept of opportunity I use here may be fluid over longer time horizons; even
durable aspects of politics may eventually change. The opportunities I describe are thus not
irreversibly hard-wired into state constitutions. Similarly, the national bars to opportunity caused
by polarization, sorting, and political geography could give way. In both cases, opportunity is
contingent over the longer-term. Indeed, as I discuss further below, the dynamics of districting
and direct democracy looked very different even four decades ago. Still, these features appear
stable over the shorter time horizons central to this Article.
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A. National Democratic Opportunity (or Not)
In the United States today, majorities face considerable
headwinds. “What began as a minor small-state advantage evolved,
over time, into a vast overrepresentation of rural states.”54 Today that
overrepresentation advantages the Republican Party in all three
branches, allowing our elections to “fly in the face of majority rule.”55
Just a brief recap will suffice here.
Conversations regarding majority rule’s challenges in the United
States often begin with the Senate.56 “[W]ithout doubt,” Professor
Lawrence Lessig wrote recently, “the most extreme institution of
minoritarian democracy in America today is the United States
Senate.”57 The Senate’s “unequal representation” is rooted in the
Connecticut Compromise—the decision that all states would receive
two senators, which gives voters from small states far more voting
power.58 Although state population differences started small,59 a
resident of Wyoming today has around 70 times the voting power of a
resident of California, as commentators often note,60 making the
Senate an outlier, both compared to other nations and compared to a
baseline of majority rule.61 Various studies show that a minority of the
population can select a Senate majority and that “[t]wo-thirds of all
Americans . . . live in the largest 15 states” and are represented by just
30 Senators.62 The other third of the population elects a
54. Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, Opinion, End Minority Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/23/opinion/sunday/disenfranchisement-democracy-min
ority-rule.html [https://perma.cc/VAZ6-8QUT].
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., FRANCES E. LEE & BRUCE I. OPPENHEIMER, SIZING UP THE SENATE: THE
UNEQUAL CONSEQUENCES OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 2 (1999); Eric W. Orts, Senate
Democracy: Our Lockean Paradox, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1981, 1984 (2019) (“The United States
Senate is radically unrepresentative.”).
57. Lessig, supra note 6.
58. See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 14, at 62; ADAM JENTLESON, KILL SWITCH: THE RISE
OF THE MODERN SENATE AND THE CRIPPLING OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 26–27 (2021).
59. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 184 (2016).
60. E.g., LEVINSON, supra note 14, at 49–62.
61. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC, supra note 14, at 49.
62. David Daley, The US Senate Is Undemocratic. That’s Bleak for Democrats’ Midterm
Hopes, GUARDIAN (Nov. 2, 2021, 6:25 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2021/nov/02/us-senate-undemocratic-democrats [https://perma.cc/QM3A-CHN9]; cf. Orts, supra
note 56, at 1985 (citing studies predicting this by 2040).
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supermajority.63 To paraphrase James Wilson’s lament, the Senate
prioritizes the interests of “the imaginary beings called states” over
each individual’s political equality.64
Pair that structure with the modern sorting of the political parties,
and it becomes a more potent form of minoritarian bias. The Senate’s
minoritarian structure would be less problematic if the divide between
small and large states (and between urban and rural areas) had no
predictable relationship to underlying political or partisan interests,65
if it could be relied upon to rotate power among those interests,66 or if
one party were so dominant that the skew could not lead to
minoritarian outcomes.67 But that is not where we are. Republicans
today dominate more small states, while Democrats are concentrated
in medium and large states.68 That is why the 50 Democratic senators
in the 117th U.S. Congress “represent 41 million more Americans than
the 50 Republicans,”69 and why, moreover, Republican senators have
not represented a national majority since 1996, despite controlling the
chamber for roughly 18 years of that period.70 And, “on average, small
states have far fewer minorities and immigrants than does the nation
as a whole.”71
The filibuster intensifies these biases. As political commentator
Adam Jentleson chronicles, the filibuster’s rise from a delay tactic to a
minority veto point now allows tiny minorities to jettison popular
legislation.72 “Over the past few decades,” he writes, “changes in the
Senate’s rules have meant that senators representing as little as 11
63. See Daley, supra note 62.
64. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC, supra note 14, at 52–54.
65. Cf. RODDEN, supra note 51 (discussing the deep divide between rural and urban voters).
66. See DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC, supra note 14, at 54.
67. See Gould & Pozen, supra note 16, at 90.
68. See id. at 115 (“Today, the most sparsely populated states tend to have Republican
majorities, and Republicans are far more likely than Democrats to be in the majority of more
than half the states even if they are in the minority nationwide.”).
69. Daley, supra note 62.
70. Stephen Wolf, How Minority Rule Plagues Senate: Republicans Last Won More Support
than Democrats Two Decades Ago, DAILY KOS (Feb. 23, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://
www.dailykos.com/stories/2021/2/23/2013769/-How-minority-rule-plagues-Senate-Republicanslast-won-more-support-than-Democrats-two-decades-ago [https://perma.cc/9NFU-3P7L].
71. Christopher Z. Mooney, The U.S. Senate: The Most Unrepresentative Body, NPR ILL.
(Feb. 9, 2021, 2:32 PM), https://www.nprillinois.org/politics/2021-02-09/the-u-s-senate-the-mostunrepresentative-body [https://perma.cc/9FFP-JX6G].
72. See JENTLESON, supra note 58, at 9–11.
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percent of the population” can block legislation.73 And again, due to
political geography, these voting rules are not politically neutral; they
tend to disproportionately favor the Republican Party.
The House of Representatives appears at first blush to fare better
as a majoritarian institution. But for less obvious reasons, it often does
not. The field of political geography teaches that the territorial
distribution of parties matters in districted elections.74 In particular, the
use of winner-take-all single-member districts advantages parties that
are more efficiently distributed throughout a state and disadvantages
parties that are concentrated in urban areas.75 When you pair that
geographic advantage with partisan gerrymandering, you get a House
that routinely gives a greater “seats bonus” to the Republican Party.76
In 1996 and 2012 (and very nearly in 2016), “Republicans even won
House majorities despite Democrats winning the House popular
vote.”77
Then there is the president, the official who in legal lore is “the
true representative of the American people”78 as a result of being “the
only nationally elected officer under the Constitution.”79 In addition to
the logical flaws of this “fable” (that is, comparing the president to
individual members of Congress rather than Congress as a whole),80 it
overlooks the bias that the Electoral College bakes in. Because states’
Electoral College votes depend on their House and Senate
representatives, the Electoral College carries forward, in part, the
Senate’s small-state skew.81 This makes possible minoritarian
73. Id. at 111.
74. See Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political
Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 8 Q.J. POL. SCI. 239, 241 (2013).
75. See RODDEN, supra note 51.
76. See, e.g., Molly E. Reynolds, Republicans in Congress Got a “Seats Bonus” This Election
(Again), BROOKINGS: FIXGOV (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2016/
11/22/gop-seats-bonus-in-congress [https://perma.cc/9T63-A2HL]; David Wasserman, The Congressional
Map Has a Record-Setting Bias Against Democrats, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 7, 2017), https://
fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-congressional-map-is-historically-biased-toward-the-gop [https:/
/perma.cc/C7UB-GHSK].
77. Bronner & Rakich, supra note 16.
78. Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53
UCLA L. REV. 1217, 1219 (2006) (critiquing this view).
79. William P. Marshall, Why the Assertion of a “Nationalist” Presidency Does Not Support
Claims for Expansive Presidential Power, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 549, 552 (2010).
80. Nzelibe, supra note 78.
81. See Gould & Pozen, supra note 16, at 116.
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outcomes that occur “in the most egregious way”82: when the Electoral
College winner loses the popular vote, as happened in 2000 and 2016.83
But it also thwarts majorities in every cycle because “it is only a tiny
fraction of American voters who actually matter to the ultimate
result.”84 Because this tiny fraction is also unrepresentative of the
nation as a whole,85 this bias in favor of swing-state voters means that
a tiny slice of “kingmakers” pick the president.86 What is more, some
scholars argue the Electoral College yields minoritarian policy-making,
in which “[p]residents . . . pursue policies that prioritize the needs of
some Americans in politically valuable constituencies over others.”87
Finally, the federal judiciary pairs the biases of the Electoral
College and the Senate through the selection process of presidential
nomination and Senate consent. Scholars have long debated whether
the federal judiciary is countermajoritarian due to its unelected status
and life tenure.88 But the modern era’s political developments take the
debate to another level. Due to polarization, sorting, and the biases
they have wrought, the federal judiciary, and the Supreme Court in

82. Lessig, supra note 6.
83. These upside-down results are more likely to favor Republicans. See generally Michael
Geruso, Dean Spears & Ishaana Talesara, Inversions in US Presidential Elections: 1836–2016, 14
AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 327 (2022) (discussing that the extent of partisan asymmetry has
favored Republicans).
84. Lessig, supra note 6; see also Nate Cohn, The Electoral College’s Real Problem: It’s
Biased Towards the Big Battlegrounds, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Mar. 22, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/22/upshot/electoral-college-votes-states.html [https://perma.cc/
B27E-HPMY] (discussing the Electoral College’s bias toward big battlegrounds). The Electoral
College is countermajoritarian in one further way, which is that, according to a recent Pew survey,
“58% of U.S. adults favored amending the Constitution so the presidential candidate who
receives the most popular votes nationwide wins.” Drew Desilver, Biden’s Victory Another
Example of How Electoral College Wins Are Bigger than Popular Vote Ones, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/12/11/bidens-victory-another-exam
ple-of-how-electoral-college-wins-are-bigger-than-popular-vote-ones [https://perma.cc/C5Z9-WCYM].
85. See Lessig, supra note 6.
86. Douglas Kriner & Andrew Reeves, The Electoral College and Presidential Particularism,
94 B.U. L. REV. 741, 747 (2014).
87. Id. See generally DOUGLAS L. KRINER & ANDREW REEVES, THE PARTICULARISTIC
PRESIDENT (2015) (theorizing and offering evidence of presidential particularism, in which
presidents disproportionately assist their electoral and partisan constituencies).
88. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (2d ed. 1986) (introducing the term “counter-majoritarian
difficulty”); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002).
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particular, “has become particularly countermajoritarian.”89 As a
recent study by legal scholars Joshua Zoffer and David Grewal shows,
this has led to a modern phenomenon of minoritarian judges who were
selected by a Senate or president (or both) lacking popular-vote
support.90 These minoritarian judges (even superminoritarian judges)
are then locked in with life tenure.91 As polarization and sorting
intensify these selection biases for judges, the Court’s enormous power
becomes more concerning.92
This is a dismal state for national democracy. It does not mean that
organizing and mobilization are hopeless tasks at the national level. As
scholars remind us, it is only through advocacy and often through
conflict that the ideas, allegiances, and political orders we regard as
fixed can change.93 Still, preserving and improving democracy is
mightily tough going in national institutions. The next Section explains
how state institutions might help.
B. State Democratic Opportunity
A determined majority can get much more traction in the states.
This Section first briefly profiles three state institutions whose
structure and purpose promote majority rule. It then explains how
state-level democracy can work to slow or even offset national
democratic decline.
1. Understanding State Institutions. The democratic opportunity
that state institutions offer begins as a function of state constitutional
law. Whereas the federal constitution self-consciously stymied popular

89. Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE L.J. 148,
156 (2019).
90. Joshua P. Zoffer & David Singh Grewal, The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty of a
Minoritarian Judiciary, 11 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 437, 442 (2020).
91. See id.
92. For discussion, see generally Nikolas Bowie, Assistant Professor of L., Harv. L. Sch.,
Written Statement, before the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES (June 30, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/
Bowie-SCOTUS-Testimony-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YQC-ZAJU] (arguing that the Supreme
Court has “wielded an antidemocratic influence on American law, one that has undermined
federal attempts to eliminate hierarchies of race, wealth, and status”).
93. E.g., Chris Maisano, It Would Be Great If the United States Were Actually a Democracy:
An Interview with Aziz Rana, JACOBIN (Feb. 16, 2021), https://jacobinmag.com/2021/02/usconstitution-interview-aziz-rana [https://perma.cc/MEP9-EXR9].
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majorities, state constitutions prioritize them.94 Indeed, as Professor
Jessica Bulman-Pozen and I have argued, the two sets of documents
have opposing and complementary concerns when it comes to majority
and minority power.95 State constitutional law has focused on the fear
of “minority faction—power wielded by the wealthy or well-connected
few—rather than majority faction.”96 The institutions that state
founding documents create, for the most part, follow in this mold.
Right out of the gate, any optimistic take on state institutions and
democracy must confront the critique that low engagement in state
elections diminishes their potential to foster majority rule. If there is
low turnout, can we really say that state institutions speak for a relevant
majority—here, a majority of eligible voters?97 I offer a few responses.
First, although a deep dive into the empirics is beyond this Article’s
scope, fears of low turnout or ballot roll-off in state elections may be
overstated or at least too generalized.98 So too may be the presumed
effects of low turnout on state policy: the state policy literature finds
that state government is responsive to public opinion,99 even if often

94.
95.
96.

See Bulman-Pozen & Seifter, supra note 31, at 861–62.
See id. at 861, 863.
G. Alan Tarr, For the People: Direct Democracy in the State Constitutional Tradition, in
DEMOCRACY: HOW DIRECT? 87, 89 (Elliott Abrams ed., 2002); see also Bulman-Pozen & Seifter,
supra note 31, at 880 (discussing this feature of state constitutionalism).
97. See generally SARAH F. ANZIA, TIMING AND TURNOUT: HOW OFF-CYCLE ELECTIONS
FAVOR ORGANIZED GROUPS (2014) (discussing how interest groups have an outsized effect on
the outcomes of low-turnout, off-cycle elections).
98. Regarding turnout, the vast majority of states hold their regular statewide elections
concurrently with federal elections, thus blunting the turnout critique. Id. at 7 (“[O]nly five states
. . . hold some or all of their regular elections in the odd-numbered years: Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New Jersey, and Virginia. The rest of the states hold elections concurrently with
national elections.”). This critique may be more apt, however, for those states that hold judicial
elections in the spring, especially where there is no major federal primary occurring. Regarding
roll-off, the phenomenon in which voters leave down-ballot races blank, the literature suggests,
at a minimum, that the extent of the phenomenon likely varies across races, states, and partisan
or nonpartisan status. For a discussion of how ballot format impacts roll-off, see Herbert M.
Kritzer, Roll-Off in State Court Elections: The Impact of the Straight-Ticket Voting Option, 4 J.L.
& CTS. 409, 415 (2016).
99. See Devin Caughey & Christopher Warshaw, Policy Preferences and Policy Change:
Dynamic Responsiveness in the American States, 1936–2014, 112 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 249, 250
(2018). For a thought-provoking inquiry into why this may hold true despite voter ignorance, see
Chris Tausanovitch, Why Are Subnational Governments Responsive?, 81 J. POL. 334, 338–41
(2019).
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not congruent with it.100 But more central to this Article, participation
levels are not hard-wired. Turnout fluctuates, and ballot roll-off is
likely amenable to election-administration and ballot-design
interventions.101 Unlike partisan polarization, which seems to be the
“mature”102 and unshakable state of our societal fabric for the
foreseeable future, civic engagement is contingent. State-level
mobilization can and does happen.103
I turn now to the democratic opportunity that different state
institutions offer. Consider first state governors. Governors today are
selected by statewide elections in all 50 states.104 The biases of the
Electoral College, discussed above, do not apply; governors need not
focus only on “swing counties” or particular regions. The movement to
elected governors was a deliberate effort to produce elected officials
that would “resist the entreaties of special interests.”105 And today’s
model of gubernatorial leadership, in which the governor typically
stands as the most powerful and visible leader of the state,106 can
generate real responsiveness to statewide majorities. Most importantly
for present purposes, gubernatorial elections are far less susceptible to
minoritarian skews. Political geography does not disadvantage
majorities, and there are no districts to be gerrymandered or

100. See Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, The Democratic Deficit in the States, 56 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 148, 149 (2012) (finding that although state policy is responsive to public opinion, it
often fails to be congruent with public opinion).
101. See, e.g., William Marble, Mail Voting Reduces Ballot Roll-Off: Evidence from
Washington State 4 (Dec. 4, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://williammarble.co/docs/
rolloff_vbm.pdf [https://perma.cc/C23E-UXBS] (finding that roll-off “significantly decreased” in
counties that “switch[ed] to all-mail elections”).
102. Pildes, supra note 52.
103. Another line of skepticism regarding state democratic opportunity might come from the
growing literature showing that voters know little about state-specific policy or officials; instead,
they rely on national-party proxies. See HOPKINS, supra note 47. That state of affairs is indeed
troubling in many respects, especially for traditional accounts of federalism and of government
closer to the people. See Schleicher, supra note 22, at 768–69. But it is less troubling for this
Article’s thesis that state institutions may provide national majorities with an opportunity for
power.
104. Governors’ Power & Authority, NAT’L GOVERNOR’S ASS’N, https://www.nga.org/gov
ernors/powers-and-authority [https://perma.cc/Q6Y5-GX78].
105. Seifter, Countermajoritarian Legislatures, supra note 27, at 1769 (quoting John Dinan,
Framing a “People’s Government”: State Constitution-Making in the Progressive Era, 30 RUTGERS
L.J. 933, 947 (1999)).
106. See Miriam Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, 131 HARV. L. REV. 483, 485–87
(2017) [hereinafter Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration].
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malapportioned. But voter suppression and big money can still distort
gubernatorial campaigns, as they do other campaigns.107 We should not
underestimate these factors and the need to attend to them through
resistance and reforms. Still, these factors are subconstitutional and
changeable. Motivated majorities can win the governor’s mansion,
without any equivalent of the Senate or Electoral College requiring
them to win with supermajority cushions.
State supreme courts often work in a similar fashion. In 38 states,
voters participate in elections to select or retain their state high court
judges and, in the vast majority, do so without districts.108 There are, of
course, deep literatures debating the advantages and disadvantages of
judicial elections. But one thing that cannot generally be argued is that
they are skewed minoritarian in the sense that a partisan minority
chooses them.109 And even accepting that judging is not itself a
majoritarian task, there are sound reasons that state reformers wanted
popular majorities to decide which individuals would fill those roles.110
The ballot initiative is the third majoritarian institution in the state
trio. Roughly half of the states currently allow voters to make statutory
or constitutional law directly.111 Like elections for governors and most
state supreme courts, the vote for or against an initiative operates
statewide. It cannot be gerrymandered or fall prey to the biases of
107. See, e.g., Robert Yablon, Voting, Spending, and the Right to Participate, 111 NW. U. L.
REV. 655, 657–58 (describing developments that have imposed burdens on voting while limiting
restrictions on money in politics).
108. See Judicial Selection: An Interactive Map, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.,
http://judicialselectionmap.brennancenter.org/?court=Supreme [https://perma.cc/6XGS-FJYJ] (showing
that 14 states allow voters to decide to retain state supreme court judges originally appointed by
the governor, 21 states host either nonpartisan or partisan elections for state supreme court
judges, and 3 states employ a hybrid model for retaining judges). According to a 2007 tally by
Professor Paul Diller, 8 states use judicial districts (4 in general elections, 4 in retention elections
only). Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1162 (2007) [hereinafter Diller,
Intrastate Preemption]. Diller posits that “a justice’s allegiance to any particular geographic area
is likely muted by the large size of the district.” Id.
109. Of course, the extent to which state judiciaries are responsive to the present day will of
the people depends on finer details of the courts’ structure and selection, including the length of
term they serve and the timing of judicial elections. See Seifter, Countermajoritarian Legislatures,
supra note 27, at 1773.
110. See JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS: PURSUING JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA 5–7 (2012) [hereinafter SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS]
(explaining factors that led states to choose to elect judges, including a desire to preserve judicial
independence from partisan politics).
111. See Bulman-Pozen & Seifter, supra note 31, at 876.
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political geography. The exception to this observation arises in the
processes for qualifying a proposal for the ballot. As discussed further
in Part II, 14 states require a threshold of signatures reflecting support
in multiple parts of the state, subject to apportionment limitations, and
the attempt to intensify such geographic requirements has become a
battleground for democracy.112
Perhaps even more so than the other two institutions in the
majoritarian trio, ballot initiatives have been strenuously criticized for
falling short of their democratic promise. Money plays a major role in
many ballot initiative campaigns.113 Information and deliberation may
be low.114 In some cases, these flaws are overstated—for example,
money plays a major role in other statewide campaigns too.115 In others,
112. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
113. See Elizabeth Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting, and Direct Democracy, 77 TEX. L. REV.
1845, 1849 (1999) (“With regard to the initial phase of this legislative process—qualification for
the ballot and the ability to trigger a popular vote—money is virtually always sufficient for success,
and it is becoming a necessary component as well.”); DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY
DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND THE POWER OF MONEY 5 (2000). In his influential 1978
article on direct democracy, Professor Derrick Bell lamented that “[t]he success or failure of
ballot-box legislation, therefore, may depend less on the merits of the issue than on who is
financing the campaign.” Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy’s Barrier to Racial
Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1, 20 (1978).
114. See Fred O. Smith, Jr., Due Process, Republicanism, and Direct Democracy, 89 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 582, 612 (2014).
115. Back-of-the-envelope calculations in initiative states reveal that the costs of initiative
campaigns vary widely; compared to a gubernatorial campaign, some initiative campaigns involve
far less spending, some involve similar spending, and some involve even more spending. To take
recent examples from states discussed in Part II, in Idaho in 2018, the winning gubernatorial
candidate raised roughly $3.37 million, Little, Brad, OPENSECRETS, https://www.followthe
money.org/entity-details?eid=6576073 [https://perma.cc/44VE-CW8X], while ballot committees
spent nearly $13 million (roughly divided between support and opposition) on an unsuccessful
initiative to legalize gambling, Contributions to Proposition 001 in Idaho 2018, OPENSECRETS,
https://www.followthemoney.org/show-me?dt=1&s=ID&y=2018&y=2018&m-id=1789 [https://pe
rma.cc/USJ5-3D5S], and $1.9 million on the successful initiative to expand Medicaid,
Contributions to Proposition 002 in Idaho 2018, OPENSECRETS, https://www.followthemo
ney.org/show-me?dt=1&s=ID&y=2018&y=2018&m-id=1790 [https://perma.cc/3BWQ-CHND].
In Michigan in the same year, the successful gubernatorial candidate spent $13.3 million, Whitmer,
Gretchen E., OPENSECRETS, https://www.followthemoney.org/entity-details?eid=253478 [https://
perma.cc/NLM9-XPQY], while committees spent $6.9 million supporting or opposing the
successful initiative to legalize marijuana, Contributions to Marijuana Legalization Initiative in
Michigan 2018, OPENSECRETS, https://www.followthemoney.org/show-me?dt=1&s=MI&y=2018
&y=2018&m-id=1743 [https://perma.cc/HBK8-8C36], and $17 million on the successful
redistricting initiative, Contributions to Independent Independent Redistricting Commission
Initiative, OPENSECRETS, https://www.followthemoney.org/show-me?dt=1&s=MI&y=2018&y=
2018&m-id=1755 [https://perma.cc/RT2W-FUWS].
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they are flaws that at least do not systematically undermine majority
rule. But again, my main response is that these flaws are not hard-wired
ones. Problems related to money, information, or deliberation are
subject to influence through regulation, norms, or other
subconstitutional practices.116 Determined majorities that care about
expanding the franchise, or about the minimum wage, or about
Medicaid coverage can still win ballot initiatives and change the game
in their state. They do not need a supermajority cushion or a
population that is evenly distributed.
Finally, there are state legislatures. These stand apart from the
core trio of state majoritarian institutions because they do use singlemember districts—and as a result, it is not unusual for them to be a
state’s least majoritarian branch and even to produce upside-down
outcomes in which the party that wins receives fewer votes overall.117
Still, state legislatures differ from Congress in that they have no Senate;
due to Reynolds v. Sims,118 both chambers must be apportioned.119
Thus, despite their flaws, state legislatures typically manage to cross a
majoritarian threshold. When they do, they too can serve majorities
better than the national lawmaking process.
2. How State Institutions Help: Defense and Diffusion. If
majorities can rule in state institutions, what good can that do? State
democratic opportunity encompasses both direct, in-state and indirect,
out-of-state benefits. These benefits may flow from offensive or
defensive state-level activity.
Start with the direct benefits. State institutions provide
opportunities for determined majorities to rule within that state and to

116. See Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency
Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (2003) (proposing administrative law
approaches to legitimize direct democracy); see also JOHN G. MATSUSAKA, LET THE PEOPLE
RULE: HOW DIRECT DEMOCRACY CAN MEET THE POPULIST CHALLENGE 228–35 (2020)
(identifying best practices for “well-functioning referendum processes”).
117. See Seifter, Countermajoritarian Legislatures, supra note 27, at 1762–63.
118. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
119. Id. at 568. In addition, state legislatures that allow for filibusters seem typically to limit
the practice to “actual debate, by actual talking” and to establish majority cloture rules, such that
“the state filibuster can remain a bastion for the voice of the minority, while not fundamentally
threatening the operation of senate chambers designed to give effect to the majority’s will.” Kyle
Grossman, The Untold Story of the State Filibuster: The History and Potential of a Neglected
Parliamentary Device, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 413, 435 (2015) (emphasis removed).
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do so now, even as they are shut out from national institutions. This
makes it possible to speak of actual rather than hypothetical American
democracy. We are not yet in a place where majorities rule nowhere.
More concretely, this offers benefits that can loosely be grouped as
defensive and offensive.
Defensively, state officials responsive to popular voting may be
less likely to subvert democracy altogether. Having majoritarian
officials serving in the offices of attorney general, the governor’s office,
state courts, and in some states, secretary of state, creates some barrier
against unpopular antidemocratic movements—or so some recent
examples suggest.120 To be sure, majoritarian officials are not the only
types of actors who might resist such incursions; career professionals
might too. Nor can majoritarian officials be relied upon to oppose
democratic erosion through and through; some will inevitably be on
board with antidemocratic efforts. The claim is thus limited and
comparative. Still, for as long as antidemocratic efforts are very
unpopular, statewide officials who condone such efforts can be
replaced by popular majorities at the next election in a way that the
president, Supreme Court Justices, or Senate majorities who
participate in such efforts cannot.
This defensive role of state-level actors has sometimes been
overlooked, but it creates immediate fingers-in-the-dam urgency. Even
apart from the pending attacks on these offices detailed in Part II, it is
imperative for organizers to prioritize elections for these offices. State
judicial elections, for example, have traditionally been “‘sleepy,’ ‘lowkey’ affairs.”121 Although that dynamic seems to be giving way to “a
120. Examples might include the refusal of Georgia’s governor and secretary of state to
interfere with election results in the state, see Greg Bluestein, How Brian Kemp Resisted Trump’s
Pressure To Overturn the Georgia Election Results, POLITICO (Mar. 19, 2022, 7:00 AM),
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/03/19/brian-kemp-david-perdue-donald-trump-20
20-00018601 [https://perma.cc/DS5A-XKAD]; Amy Gardner, ‘I Just Want To Find 11,780 Votes’:
In Extraordinary Hour-Long Call, Trump Pressures Georgia Secretary of State To Recalculate the
Vote in His Favor, WASH. POST (Jan. 3, 2021, 9:59 PM), https://www.washington
post.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/d45acb92-4dc4-11eb-bda4-61
5aaefd0555_story.html [https://perma.cc/AG4P-NC8E], or Ohio’s chief justice rejecting partisan
efforts to disregard constitutional fair districting requirements, see League of Women Voters of
Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm’n, No. 2021-1193, slip op. at 20 (Ohio Mar. 16, 2022)
(O’Connor, C.J., concurring), or governors vetoing election subversion bills, see infra note 139
and accompanying text.
121. David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 266 n.3 (2008)
(listing many sources using these descriptors).
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new era” of higher-profile, more contentious judicial elections,122 it
remains the case that voters may have little information about
candidates and that uncontested elections remain; as recently as 2017,
a conservative state supreme court justice in the key swing state of
Wisconsin ran uncontested.123 Yet state courts will decide critically
important disputes in the coming years regarding elections, public
health, criminal justice, and much more. Similarly, some state
governors are “a sea wall against a rising Republican tide of . . . farreaching election laws,”124 and ballot initiatives are one of the few ways
to expand the franchise in many states. The longstanding practice of
neglecting state politics could allow the dam to break.
Offensively, the direct benefits of state democratic opportunity
allow popular policies to be enacted or protected in a state. These
policies may address the democratic process head-on, as exemplified
by the states that have used ballot initiatives to expand the franchise or
to create independent redistricting commissions,125 or the state
supreme courts that have protected voting rights or rejected partisan
gerrymandering.126 Or they may functionally bolster the democratic

122. See id. at 267–68.
123. See Marti Mikkelson, Why No Challenger for Wisconsin Supreme Court Election This
Spring?, WUWM 89.7 FM (Feb. 10, 2017, 12:05 AM), https://www.wuwm.com/politicsgovernment/2017-02-10/why-no-challenger-for-wisconsin-supreme-court-election-this-spring [htt
ps://perma.cc/DS62-YKAN]. The justice who ran uncontested, Annette Ziegler, is now in the
midst of a ten-year term and is serving as the court’s chief justice. Shawn Johnson, Annette Ziegler
Elected Chief Justice of Wisconsin Supreme Court, WISC. PUB. RADIO (Apr. 14, 2021, 4:10 PM),
https://www.wpr.org/annette-ziegler-elected-chief-justice-wisconsin-supreme-court [https://perm
a.cc/HR7Y-UCLD].
124. See Reid J. Epstein & Nick Corasaniti, Why Democrats See 3 Governor’s Races as a Sea
Wall for Fair Elections, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/06/us/
politics/governor-races-democrats.html [https://perma.cc/U3ZQ-C2JR].
125. See Paul A. Diller, Toward Fairer Representation in State Legislatures, 33 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 135, 166 (2022) (listing states that have adopted districting reform through ballot
initiatives). On expansions of the franchise, see, for example, Nicholas Ansel, Advancing Criminal
Reform Through Ballot Initiatives, 53 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 273 app.B (2021) (listing successful ballot
measures in Rhode Island, California, and Florida).
126. See, e.g., League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 821 (Pa. 2018)
(holding that redistricting plan violated the Pennsylvania Constitution); Harper v. Hall, 868
S.E.2d 499, 559 (N.C. 2022) (holding that redistricting plan violated the North Carolina
Constitution).
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process without addressing it expressly, by adopting measures that
promote popular power and inclusion.127
Then there are the crucial indirect benefits. Democratic
opportunity in state institutions gives democracy a chance to spread.
The literature on policy diffusion is voluminous, dating back to the
1960s.128 A few key insights suffice to show the potential. First, a
democratic achievement in one state can change the Overton window,
or the view among policymakers of what is possible. It can also
generate social or professional pressure to conform.129 Relatedly, a
democratic achievement in one state can facilitate learning between
states.130 A state court decision may provide the key vocabulary and
legal reasoning for a decision131; a state law or ballot initiative may
provide a blueprint for what works.132 Diffusion scholars also indicate
that states might adopt a first-mover-state’s policies as a form of
competition.133

127. See, e.g., Andrias & Sachs, supra note 12, at 606, 608 (discussing how states could fund
“social-movement organizations”).
128. For some helpful orienting works, see ANDREW KARCH, DEMOCRATIC
LABORATORIES: POLICY DIFFUSION AMONG THE AMERICAN STATES 14 (2007); Charles R.
Shipan & Craig Volden, Policy Diffusion: Seven Lessons for Scholars and Practitioners, 72 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 788, 793 (2012); Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, The Mechanisms of Policy
Diffusion, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 840, 841–42 (2008) [hereinafter Shipan & Volden, Mechanisms of
Policy Diffusion]; Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, State Lottery Adoptions as Policy
Innovations: An Event History Analysis, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 395, 399–400 (1990); Jack L.
Walker, The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 880,
881 (1969); and Virginia Gray, Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study, 67 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
1174, 1175 (1973).
129. See Heather K. Gerken, Shortcuts to Reform, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1582, 1607 (2009) (noting
“the ways in which behavioral ‘scripts’ signal prestige and become the model for institutional
behavior”).
130. See, e.g., Craig Volden, States as Policy Laboratories: Emulating Success in the Children’s
Health Insurance Program, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 294, 304 (2006) (noting that individual states’
children’s health insurance program policies “converge[d] over time toward policies in similar
states and in successful states”).
131. See, e.g., Shane A. Gleason & Robert M. Howard, State Supreme Courts and Shared
Networking: The Diffusion of Education Policy, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1485, 1511 (2015) (finding that,
within the context of education finance reform, “citations matter—they allow state courts to
transmit models of policy change and implementation from one to another”).
132. See, e.g., KARCH, supra note 128, at 17 (describing extensive mimicry among states on a
range of policy issues).
133. See, e.g., Shipan & Volden, Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion, supra note 128.
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To be sure, there are important critical perspectives on state-level
policy diffusion. It does not always work,134 and perhaps the wrong
ideas will spread.135 Indeed, diffusion provides an important
explanation for the deluge of antidemocratic laws described in Part II.
But it is easy to see how the levers of diffusion could function in aid of
democracy and have already started to do so. Scholars have already
observed how innovations that facilitate voting or that expand the
franchise in one state spread to other states.136 Other pro-democracy
reforms may spread in similar fashion. State court decisions that serve
democracy, such as Pennsylvania’s rejection of extreme partisan
gerrymandering137 or Idaho’s rejection of ballot-initiative
obliteration,138 provide a constitutional roadmap and vocabulary for
other states. Gubernatorial vetoes rejecting efforts to install actors who
would not uphold legitimate election results can provide a shared social
and professional reference point.139 And at some point, the competition
aspect of diffusion could inform decisions of moderate or swing-vote
decisionmakers in the states—say, if large companies prefer to locate
in democracy-friendly jurisdictions. In all of these ways, state
institutions can provide a springboard toward increased enactment of
popular pro-democracy positions, as successes in one state snowball—
not just to like-minded states controlled by the same political party, but

134. See Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in
Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1339 (2009).
135. See Michael A. Livermore, The Perils of Experimentation, 126 YALE L.J. 636, 707 (2017)
(arguing that organized interest groups may have an advantage over diffuse constituents in using
information from one jurisdiction to advance their policies elsewhere).
136. See, e.g., Daniel R. Biggers & Michael J. Hanmer, Who Makes Voting Convenient?
Explaining the Adoption of Early and No-Excuse Absentee Voting in the American States, 15
STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 192, 202–03 (2015); Jereny Mendoza, The Diffusion of Less Restrictive
Felon Disenfranchisement Laws in the U.S. 24 (Aug. 25, 2021) (M.A. report, University of Texas
at Austin), https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/90804/MENDOZAMASTE RSREPORT-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/54EM-WFZR]; see also HEATHER K. GERKEN,
THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION SYSTEM IS FAILING AND HOW TO FIX IT 5–6
(2009) (proposing a “Democracy Index” that would, among other benefits, facilitate the
dissemination of best practices in election administration).
137. League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 818–19, 821 (Pa. 2018).
138. Reclaim Idaho v. Denney, 497 P.3d 160, 191 (Idaho 2021).
139. See, e.g., VOTING RTS. LAB, A THREAT TO OUR DEMOCRACY: ELECTION SUBVERSION
IN THE 2021 LEGISLATIVE SESSION 4, 8 (2021) (describing election-subversion bills that governors
in Pennsylvania and Wisconsin vetoed).
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also to states in which groundswells of support change or sidestep
partisan recalcitrance.
It is worth stressing just how pivotal state and local actors are to
both the mechanisms of diffusion and their prospects.140 When federal
pathways are closed or steeply uphill, it is states that provide points of
entry for organizers.141 Reformers in states and localities can then
generate the vocabulary, blueprint, and mobilization that will spur
copycat efforts in other states.142 This Article’s focus on democratic
opportunity thus provides a constitutional and institutional companion
to the policy diffusion literature, which emphasizes that policies often
move from the bottom up.143
Finally, state institutions provide more than just horizontal spread
of pro-democratic policy. Because state institutions both formally and
informally shape the national government itself and national decisionmaking, through state administration of elections and through
processes such as executive federalism144 and federal-state
consultations,145 democratically composed state institutions can inject
the popular will into national governance.
140. A related literature explores how state-level actors may spur changes in national
partisan positions. See, e.g., ERIC SHICKLER, RACIAL REALIGNMENT: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM, 1932–1965, at 1 (2016) (describing how realignment of the national
political parties “was rooted in state and local politics rather than in Washington, DC”); Daniel
Hopkins, Eric Shickler & David L. Azizi, From Many Divides, One? The Polarization and
Nationalization of American State Party Platforms, 1918-2017, at 14 (Jan. 12, 2022) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3772946 [https://perma.cc/XHA2-V4CN] (discussing “the
potentially critical role that relatively decentralized activists and state parties can play in
generating coalitional change nationwide”).
141. See, e.g., KARCH, supra note 128, at 15 (noting how states began to develop health care
policy against the backdrop of congressional inaction on the topic); cf. Paul Diller, Why Do Cities
Innovate in Public Health? Implications of Scale and Structure, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1219, 1266–
67 (arguing that one reason local governments innovate is because city-level lawmaking is less
“sclerotic” and has fewer vetogates than lawmaking at higher levels of government). See generally
Olatunde C.A. Johnson, The Local Turn; Innovation and Diffusion in Civil Rights Law, 79 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 115 (2016) (analyzing civil rights innovations at the subnational level).
142. See Johnson, supra note 141, at 142–43.
143. See, e.g., Shipan & Volden, Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion, supra note 128; see also
Jamila Michener, Medicaid and the Policy Feedback Foundations of Universal Healthcare, 685
ANNALS. AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 116, 125 (2019) (“Building political momentum in the
states is an offensive strategy for eventual national change.”).
144. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L. REV. 953,
954 (2016).
145. See Miriam Seifter, States as Interest Groups in the Administrative Process, 100 VA. L.
REV. 953, 970–71 (2014).
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II. RECENT ATTACKS ON STATE MAJORITARIAN INSTITUTIONS
State majoritarian institutions are therefore crucial, but they have
recently come under attack. The attacks are principally the work of
Republican state legislatures, which have intensified efforts to cement
their power.146 The common features of the attacks reflect coordinated
efforts by these legislatures and a private network of collaborators.147
But it is not only Republican legislatures that have undermined or
neglected state-level democracy.148 Moreover, not all of the conflicts
reflect interparty battles; some result from intraparty strife, while
others, in the ballot initiative context, are centered in conflicts between
legislatures and popular mobilizations.

146. See Charles Homans, Where Does American Democracy Go from Here?, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (Mar. 17, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/03/17magazine/democracy.
html [https://perma.cc/6E44-B7JD] (interviewing a bipartisan group of democracy experts who
discussed the presence of antidemocratic forces within the Republican Party).
147. See ALEXANDER HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, STATE CAPTURE: HOW CONSERVATIVE
ACTIVISTS, BIG BUSINESSES, AND WEALTHY DONORS RESHAPED THE AMERICAN STATES—
AND THE NATION 1–19 (2018). For recognition of this trend in the realm of election
administration, see STATES UNITED DEMOCRACY CTR., DEMOCRACY CRISIS IN THE MAKING
REPORT UPDATE: 2021 YEAR-END NUMBERS 1 (2021) [hereinafter STATES UNITED REPORT
DECEMBER 2021 UPDATE], https://statesuniteddemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Dem
ocracy-Crisis-Report_FINAL-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/B938-PGF6] (identifying “a dangerous trend
underway in state legislatures: . . . taking up proposals that would politicize, criminalize, and
interfere in election administration”). In the realm of public health, see, for example, NETWORK
FOR PUB. HEALTH L. & NAT’L ASS’N CNTY. & CITY HEALTH OFFS., PROPOSED LIMITS ON
PUBLIC HEALTH AUTHORITY: DANGEROUS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH (2021), https://www.net
workforphl.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Proposed-Limits-on-Public-Health-Authority-Dang
erous-for-Public-Health-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/JE53-473K]; Christine Vestal, New State
Laws Hamstring Public Health Officials, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 29, 2021), https://www.pew
trusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2021/07/29/new-state-laws-hamstring-public-h
ealth-officials [https://perma.cc/WT5T-E4ES]. In the context of ballot initiatives, see Defend
Direct Democracy Campaign, BALLOT INITIATIVE STRATEGY CTR., https://ballot.org/defend
directdemocracy-campaign [https://perma.cc/8UPX-2LE7] (describing “organized, well-funded”
efforts “to break down the People’s access to the ballot measure process in states with GOP
majorities where voters have approved progressive ballot measures”).
148. See Sean Morales-Doyle & Chisun Lee, New York’s Worst-in-the-Country Voting
System, ATLANTIC (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/09/new-yo
rks-worst-in-the-country-voting-system/570223 [https://perma.cc/52MG-6HTT]. In the past few
years, New York has enacted new laws that make voting somewhat easier. See Amy Sherman,
Ask PolitiFact: Are New York’s Voter Laws More Restrictive Than Georgia’s?, POLITIFACT (Apr.
8, 2021), https://www.politifact.com/article/2021/apr/08/ask-politifact-are-new-yorks-voter-lawsmore-restr [https://perma.cc/G25M-P6LJ] (quoting attorney Sean Morales-Doyle’s statement
that “New York has a long history of a not very open democracy, but it is heading in the opposite
direction”).
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As described at the outset, these attacks have either flown under
the radar or been considered individually, at least by scholars and in
public discussion. This Part presents them as part of a shared
undertaking against majoritarian institutions, typically initiated by
partisan forces in state legislatures. The attacks fall into three
categories: those that transform jurisdiction-wide elections into
districted elections, opening the door to skews and manipulation; those
that impose burdens on direct democracy; and those that strip power
from officials selected through statewide election to partisans or other
entities.
A. Districting Everything
One way to transform majoritarian institutions into minoritarian
ones is to alter selection methods from jurisdiction-wide selection to
districted selection. As discussed above, governors, other state
executives, state supreme courts, and ballot initiatives are typically
majoritarian institutions in that they are voted upon by the statewide
electorate. Switching those elections to districted votes replicates the
minoritarian bias already discussed with respect to state legislatures.
When it comes to state courts and ballot initiatives, legislative
proponents are attempting just that.
To be clear, the discussion that follows is not an argument against
any use of districts. Geographically rooted representation has
benefits.149 When the districted body also crosses a majoritarian
threshold—or in systems that pair districts with proportional
representation or hybrid schemes—districts can be compatible with
both majoritarian democracy and, importantly, voice for minority
interests.150 The problem of the moment, however, is state legislative
efforts to deploy districts to leverage their minoritarian bias.

149. See Benjamin Plener Cover, Two Party Structural Countermandering, 107 IOWA L. REV.
63, 76 (2021).
150. See id. This is not to say that territorial districts are the best way of achieving voice for
minority interests. See Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A
Case of the Emperor’s Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1594 (1993) (explaining how courts sought
to advance racial-group representation within the districted electoral system we have, but arguing
that winner-take-all, territorial districts are not the most effective way to achieve representation).
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1. Judicial Elections. We can think of the recent developments in
judicial districting as “a new kind of gerrymandering.”151 Rather than
the more familiar move of manipulating existing district lines, this
approach involves “an escalation”152: establishing districts in the first
place to achieve minoritarian bias. As Professor Jed Shugerman writes
in a recent essay, “State supreme courts have become a new
battleground of partisan districting.”153 In the two most recent
legislative sessions, proposals in roughly six states “would either
gerrymander existing courts or create new ones, in response to the
perception that current courts are insufficiently supportive of
outcomes favored by the legislature.”154 In additional states that
already have some form of districts for judicial elections, the redrawing
of lines is becoming a new flashpoint for partisan battles.
Take Pennsylvania, a state where “Republicans . . . have
historically used gerrymandering to maintain their majority in the
legislature, despite Democratic victories in statewide elections.”155 As
Professor Jonathan Rodden’s work and my own work have shown, the
use (and drawing) of districts has allowed Pennsylvania’s legislature to
veer into minoritarian territory. Adopting judicial districts could
achieve the same result in the courts. Given its geography, including
“two densely populated Democratic cities and large rural areas,”
districting “could give outsize representation to sparsely populated
places that lean more conservative, particularly if the legislature resorts
to a gerrymandering tactic similar to one used in Pennsylvania in
2011.”156

151. Nick Corasaniti, Pennsylvania GOP’s Push for More Power over Judiciary Raises
Alarms, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/15/us/politics/pennsylva
nia-republicans.html [https://perma.cc/H9J6-4S7U].
152. Id.
153. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Countering Gerrymandered Courts, 122 COLUM. L. REV.
F. 18, 23 (2022) [hereinafter Shugerman, Countering Gerrymandered Courts].
154. Patrick Berry, Alicia Bannon & Douglas Keith, Legislative Assaults on State Courts –
May 2021 Update, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (May 19, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/research-reports/legislative-assaults-state-courts-2021#ch2 [https://perma.cc/A59Z-X9DY].
As discussed further below, the states proposing the establishment of districts are Pennsylvania,
Montana, and New Mexico; Tennessee and Texas would have also created new courts. See id.
Efforts in Washington and New Mexico failed. See S.J. RES. 8215, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.
2020); Berry et al., supra (noting that the New Mexico proposal did not advance).
155. Corasaniti, supra note 151.
156. Id.
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The proposal, a constitutional amendment that has not reached
the ballot, would attempt that. It would organize Pennsylvania’s trial,
appellate, and supreme courts into districts, with district lines drawn by
the Republican-controlled legislature.157 The district lines would both
define the electorate for judicial seats and determine eligibility for
office; only residents of a district would vote in their district’s judicial
election, and eligible candidates would be required to reside in that
district.
The arguments in favor both echo some of districting’s traditional
benefits and perform the sleights of hand that make threats to
democracy seem like advancements of it. In public statements,
Pennsylvania Republicans have articulated that districting would
improve representation in the judiciary. They argue that it would “give
different regions of Pennsylvania more representation”158 and, in
particular, ameliorate underrepresentation of rural areas.159 Relatedly,
the bill’s sponsor, Russ Diamond, told the New York Times that “the
same statewide consensus [that] goes in making law should come to
bear when those statutes are heard” by courts.160
The obvious analogies here—and their obvious rejoinders—are to
arguments regarding the United States Senate. Its defenders (and the
beneficiaries of its lopsided representation) argue the map of the
United States should be represented in the Senate; its critics note that
the Senate should equally represent people, not soil. So too here, none
of the proponents of House Bill 38 argue that judicial districts would
advance majority rule or contend with the likelihood that districts
drawn by the Republican legislature would favor the Republican Party.
Rather, they emphasize different representative virtues. They
argue that elections should not be dominated by just a few regions of
157. H.B. 38, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2021). Although the current bill text is silent
on the number of commonwealth and superior court districts, a legislative cosponsor’s
memorandum states that there would be 9 and 15, respectively. See Memorandum from Rep. Russ
Diamond, on Regional Appellate Court Districts, Pa. H. of Reps. (Dec. 1, 2020) [hereinafter
Diamond Memorandum], https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/Legis/CSM/showMemoPublic.cfm
?chamber=H&SPick=20210&cosponId=32798 [https://perma.cc/2DXQ-WRN2].
158. Corasaniti, supra note 151.
159. Virginia Hinrichs McMichael, Should Pennsylvania Amend Its Constitution To Elect
Appellate Judges by Region?, LAW.COM: THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Feb. 9, 2021, 9:26 AM),
https://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/2021/02/09/should-pa-amend-its-constitution-to-electappellate-judges-by-region [https://perma.cc/9DHD-8W7V].
160. Corasaniti, supra note 151.
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the state, even if those regions have most of the people, and they
promote the benefit of having a closer connection between a judge and
their voters.161 Diamond’s official memorandum on the bill focuses
almost exclusively on the residency component (which does not, in
theory, require districted voting), touting the benefits of “judicial
diversity” and having judges hail from more parts of the state.162
To be sure, the Pennsylvania effort does have one majoritarian
component: it can only become part of the constitution if passed by a
majority vote of the state electorate. In Pennsylvania, ballot initiatives
usually pass.163 Voter approval of the measure would muddle the
picture of its majoritarian status as a conceptual matter. As a legal
matter, it may be that passage by ballot initiative is not sufficient to
save a judicial gerrymander. The Supreme Court has reasoned along
those lines in its apportionment cases, when it held that an unequal
apportionment plan could not be sustained simply because it was
adopted by popular referendum.164 The same conclusion would seem
to follow more forcefully under the state constitutional democracy
principle.165
A similar effort recently played out in Montana. That state now
has its first unified party government in over fifteen years, which has
prompted a wave of “aggressively conservative measures,” including
several aimed at the state courts—which “has for years been seen by
Montana’s hardline conservatives as a left-leaning institution.”166 As

161. For a review of the literature on how districting promotes such benefits, see generally
Cover, supra note 149.
162. Diamond Memorandum, supra note 157; see also Kadida Kenner, Should Pa. Elect
Judges Based on Geography? Pro/Con, PHILA. INQUIRER (Feb. 4, 2021), https://www.inquir
er.com/opinion/commentary/appellate-court-elections-pennsylvania-judicial-gerrymandering-20
210204.html [https://perma.cc/AQ7T-BVFR] (advocating for judges to be required to reside in
the district they serve).
163. See Brian X. McCrone, Pa. Voters Have a Really Hard Time Saying ‘No’ to Ballot
Questions, NBC PHILA. (May 21, 2021, 7:04 PM), https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/politics/
pa-voters-have-a-really-hard-time-saying-no-to-ballot-questions/2821894/?amp=1 [https://perma.
cc/SF2K-K76K].
164. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of State of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 736 (1964) (“An
individual’s constitutionally protected right to cast an equally weighted vote cannot be denied
even by a vote of a majority of a State’s electorate . . . .”).
165. See Bulman-Pozen & Seifter, supra note 31.
166. Eric Dietrich, Republicans Target Alleged Bias in Supreme Court Crisis, MONT. FREE
PRESS (Apr. 16, 2021), https://montanafreepress.org/2021/04/16/republicans-target-alleged-biasin-supreme-court-crisis [https://perma.cc/U7CP-UFU7].
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part of that wave of proposals, a legislative referendum to establish
judicial districts was slated to appear on the ballot in November 2022.167
Had the referendum reached the ballot and passed, each of Montana’s
seven supreme court justices would have been elected from one of
seven districts. The arguments made in favor of and against the
proposal tracked those in Pennsylvania. Proponents touted
geographical diversity168 and “help[ing] get our Supreme Court a little
more aligned with our electorate.”169 In contrast, critics of the bill,
which public records indicate was drafted by a well-established
conservative political consultant, argued the move smacked of partisan
warfare.170 In the words of one Democratic former justice of the state
supreme court, “I think the Republican Party just thinks that [the
Montana Supreme Court] is a little too liberal right now, and they’re
looking for ways to consolidate a little more power to the conservative
base.”171
Instead, the Montana Supreme Court held the legislative
referendum unconstitutional in August 2022.172 The legislature had

167. The bill originated as House Bill 325 and would have appeared on the ballot as
Legislative Referendum 132. See Montana House Bill 325: Summary, LEGISCAN,
https://legiscan.com/MT/bill/HB325/2021 [https://perma.cc/Q3KG-AJGS]; Ballot Language for
Legislative Referendum No. 132 (LR-132), MONT. SEC’Y STATE, https://sosmt.gov/wpcontent/uploads/LR-132-Ballot-Statement-Language.pdf [https://perma.cc/44W6-ZEKS]. Another
prominent and controversial measure eliminated the state’s judicial nominating commission,
allowing Republican Governor Greg Gianforte to fill judicial vacancies directly. See Keith
Schubert, Gov. Gianforte Signs Bill Giving Himself Power To Fill Judicial Vacancies, GREAT
FALLS TRIB. (Mar. 17, 2021, 10:20 AM), https://www.greatfallstribune.com/story/news/2021/
03/17/gianforte-signs-montana-bill-giving-himself-power-fill-judicial-vacancies/4733363001 [https
://perma.cc/3U29-UUS3].
168. Keith Schubert, Bill To Change Supreme Court Races Gets First Hearing in House
Judiciary, DAILY MONTANAN (Feb. 10, 2021, 6:41 PM), https://dailymontanan.com/2021/02/10/
bill-to-change-supreme-court-races-gets-first-hearing-in-house-judiciary [https://perma.cc/S6B6F9T9].
169. Elliott Thornton, A Court Divided?, MONT. FREE PRESS (Mar. 26, 2021),
https://montanafreepress.org/2021/03/26/a-court-divided-house-bill-325-supreme-cout-election-b
y-district [https://perma.cc/B8GM-6QE6].
170. See id.
171. Id.
172. See McDonald v. Jacobsen, 2022 MT 160U, ¶¶ 54–58 (holding placement of ballot
initiative unconstitutional); Amy Beth Hanson, Montana High Court Election Changes Ruled
Unconstitutional, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 22, 2022), https://apnews.com/article/electionslegislature-montana-constitutions-referendums-86b0bc956a893704e8e05140045f5ae0 [https://per
ma.cc/3RLW-ME4A] (reporting that a District Court judge found the Montana Legislature’s
proposed referendum unconstitutional and blocked it).
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pressed the referendum despite a binding 2012 Montana Supreme
Court decision holding a similar change facially unconstitutional173—
perhaps a reflection of a litigation choice that may reflect the
legislature’s extended, rancorous conflict in which it has questioned the
legitimacy of the state supreme court.174 That prior ruling proved
dispositive: the court held that it had “already squarely addressed the
constitutionality of a legislative referendum replacing statewide
elections for Supreme Court seats with district-wide elections”175 and
concluded that the prior ruling was neither distinguishable nor
incorrect.176
Once again, the proposal had a democratic aspect. Because the
legislature chose to enact it via legislative referendum, it would only
have become law if passed by a majority of Montana voters. As in
Pennsylvania, these measures typically pass, often by impressive
margins.177 Yet the Montana Supreme Court saw the democratic stakes
differently: the measure, the court noted, would have “den[ied]
Montana voters a say in the identity of six out of the seven individuals”
serving on a supreme court with statewide jurisdiction, at odds with
“the spirit of protecting the right of all Montanans to vote that
animates” relevant provisions of the state constitution.178
In other states, judicial districts already exist but are now being
leveraged in partisan battle. In the recent past, the drawing of these
districts was not obviously freighted with partisanship.179 Today,
however, a failure to draw lines, thus maintaining malapportioned
districts, might threaten judicial majoritarianism. Illinois provides an

173. Reichert v. State ex rel. McCulloch, 278 P.3d 455, 483 (Mont. 2012).
174. See Dietrich, supra note 166 (describing conservative lawmakers’ efforts to investigate
and change the state judiciary).
175. McDonald, 2022 MT 160U, ¶ 29.
176. See id. ¶¶ 26–53.
177. See Anthony Johnstone, The Constitutional Initiative in Montana, 71 MONT. L. REV. 325,
352 (2010) (“Compared with constitutional amendments, voters show even greater deference to
the Legislature in statutory referenda, passing nine (69%) of the 13 legislative referenda since
1972 by 65% for the average successful measure.”).
178. McDonald, 2022 MT 160U, ¶ 54.
179. See Diller, Intrastate Preemption, supra note 108 (noting that at the state supreme court
level, “a justice’s allegiance to any particular geographic area is likely muted by the large size of
the district as compared to the average state legislative district’s size”). More distant history did
involve the use of judicial districts for partisan gain. See Shugerman, Countering Gerrymandered
Courts, supra note 153; SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS, supra note 110.
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example of this. Since 1964, Illinois used districts that became skewed
in favor of Republicans180—but because Democrats won those seats
anyway, the situation did not breed conflict. In 2020, one Democratic
justice lost a retention election, paving the way for the court to flip to
Republican control, even in a state that supported Joe Biden 57–40,
unless the judicial districts were redrawn.181 The governor recently
signed new maps for the Illinois Supreme Court into law.182 A threejudge panel rejected constitutional and statutory challenges to the
maps.183
2. Ballot Initiatives. A similar story is playing out with ballot
initiatives. State legislatures in numerous states have proposed
establishing or intensifying district-based requirements for ballot
initiatives. (As I discuss in the next Section, these are of a piece with
other efforts to make ballot initiatives less feasible overall.)
By way of background, all states that use the ballot initiative
require the collection of some number of signatures in advance. “Some
states also include signatures to be gathered from across the state,
although some of these requirements have been found to be
unconstitutional.”184 As of 2021, “ten states do not have a geographic
requirement; 14 states do.”185

180. See Stephen Wolf, Illinois’ Supreme Court Elections Could Lead to a Decade of GOP
Minority Rule Unless Democrats Act, DAILY KOS (May 20, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.da
ilykos.com/stories/2021/5/20/2017734/-Illinois-Supreme-Court-elections-could-lead-to-a-decadeof-GOP-minority-rule-unless-Democrats-act [https://perma.cc/NYA9-YPRV]. Per one commentator,
the districts have “become so badly disproportional that the largest of the single-member districts,
the 2nd, is home to more people than the two smallest—the 4th and 5th—combined,” which has
resulted in benefits for “more rural areas in the southern part of the state at the expense of voters
in the Democratic-leaning Chicago suburbs.” Id.
181. Rick Pearson, Gov. J.B. Pritzker Signs into Law New Maps for Illinois Legislature, State
Supreme Court, CHI. TRIB. (June 4, 2021, 4:38 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/politics/ctpritzker-signs-illinois-legislative-redistricting-maps-20210604-hyohgbgxgjbnddheirxuhx7u5m-sto
ry.html [https://perma.cc/X2JG-2JV3].
182. See id.; Illinois Judicial Redistricting, ILLINOISCOURTS.GOV, https://www.illinoiscourts.
gov/public/illinois-judicial-redistricting [https://perma.cc/29KL-75LZ] (“Effective January 1, 2022,
Public Act 102-0011 (Act), will change the judicial district boundaries for the first time since they
were established in 1964.”).
183. McConchie v. Scholz, 577 F. Supp. 3d 842, 851–52 (N.D. Ill. 2021).
184. Initiative and Referendum Processes, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 4,
2022), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/initiative-and-referendum-process
es.aspx [https://perma.cc/34WU-PPPY] (click “Citizen Initiatives”; then click “Signatures”).
185. Id.

SEIFTER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

312

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

10/16/2022 11:35 AM

[Vol. 72:275

Laws requiring geographic distribution of signatures of course do
not offer exactly the same geographic representation advantages
associated with legislative districts—they do not cause a legislator to
feel more bound to her constituents, and so on.186 Instead, districtbased signature requirements for ballot initiatives, at their best, are
rooted in a different state tradition: that of avoiding “local” or
“special” legislation. State constitutions generally prohibit such
legislation in an effort to ensure that state legislators focus on matters
of true public interest.187 So too with ballot initiatives. Geographic
distribution proponents argue that they “prevent[] voter confusion and
inefficiency by preventing the ballot from being cluttered with items of
primarily local interest, but which would have state-wide impact.”188
But requiring geographically distributed signature requirements
can also burden democracy in two ways. First, some states’ signature
requirements have perpetrated the same inequality that has long been
deemed unconstitutional for legislative districts: they give equal power
to geographic units, such as counties, that do not have equal
populations.189 Although these ballot districting cases are not as wellknown as legislative analogues like Reynolds v. Sims, state and federal
courts have generally ruled the same way, invalidating a number of
such signature laws under state or federal one-person, one-vote
requirements.190 For example, the Ninth Circuit held that Idaho’s
186. See Cover, supra note 149.
187. On special legislation bans in the states, see Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in
State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1209 (1985).
188. Angle v. Miller, 673 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting the parties’ briefing).
189. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380–81 (1963) (rejecting Georgia’s county-unit system
for weighting votes as violative of the U.S. Constitution); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568
(1964) (holding that state legislatures must be apportioned by population).
190. See Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1092, 1097 (Utah 2002) (rejecting as
unconstitutional a “multi-county signature requirement” for ballot initiatives that “allow[ed]
voters in rural counties to wield disproportionate power over the placement of initiatives on the
ballot”); Mont. Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp. v. Johnson, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1230 (D. Mont. 2005)
(invalidating Montana’s constitutional amendment requiring signatures from 5 percent of electors
in at least half of the state’s counties); Bernbeck v. Gale, 58 F. Supp. 3d 949, 950 (D. Neb. 2014)
(holding that Nebraska’s geographic requirement—5 percent of the population from two of its
five counties—violated the U.S. Constitution’s one-person, one-vote requirement because it gave
“more weight to the power of rural votes”), vacated due to lack of standing, 829 F.3d 643 (8th Cir.
2016). The Ninth Circuit invalidated a Nevada constitutional provision that required signatures
from 10 percent of voters in 13 of Nevada’s 17 counties, ACLU of Nev. v. Lomax, 471 F.3d 1010,
1021 (9th Cir. 2006), and a federal district court rejected a revised law requiring signatures from
10 percent of voters in all of the state’s counties, Marijuana Pol’y Project v. Miller, 578 F. Supp.
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geographic requirement “violate[d] equal protection because the few
voters in a sparsely populated county have a power equal to the vastly
larger number of voters who reside in a populous county.”191
In addition to giving outsized influence to rural areas, geographic
distribution requirements—and the amped up versions of them passed
in recent years—may also impede majority rule by making it harder for
measures with majority support to reach the ballot, especially when
supporters are numerous but geographically concentrated. Indeed,
states have defended distributional requirements (unsuccessfully) on
the basis that they limit majority rule in the same tradition as the
Electoral College or United States Senate.192 Even when signature
rules draw from equipopulous districts to comply with constitutional
requirements, requiring buy-in from all or most districts can give veto
power to small communities.193 Perhaps more significantly, strict
distributional requirements raise the cost of ballot initiatives. It is
expensive to do outreach and obtain signatures throughout all regions
of the state. Like other burdens on direct democracy discussed in Part
II.B, these strict districting measures may raise the price of access so
high that even widely popular measures cannot reach the ballot.
Consider recent developments in Idaho. For most of its history,
Idaho had no geographic distribution requirement for initiatives;
signatures could come from 10 percent of voters anywhere in the state

2d 1290, 1307–09 (D. Nev. 2008), but later upheld a revised provision that requires proponents to
obtain signatures from 10 percent of voters in each of the state’s equipopulous congressional
districts, Angle, 673 F.3d at 1128; see also Semple v. Griswold, 934 F.3d 1134, 1156 (10th Cir. 2019)
(upholding that Colorado’s constitutional amendment requiring signatures from at least 2 percent
of voters in each state senate district on the grounds that the senate districts were roughly
equipopulous).
191. Idaho Coal. United for Bears v. Cenarrusa, 342 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003).
192. See id. (describing Idaho’s arguments).
193. When based upon equipopulous districts and low signature thresholds, this would not
necessarily track urban-rural or partisan splits, but it would mean that any given community in
which there was strong opposition could sink the measure for the rest of the state. The extent of
this burden would be interesting to explore. On one hand, signature requirements in the single
digits or low double-digits would not appear to produce results as minoritarian as the legislative
or judicial districting situations where proponents need to win an unfavorable district outright.
On the other hand, the ballot signature context can be a more muscular form of minority veto
when all or almost all districts must lend support; then, unlike in a typical legislative or judicial
election, any one relatively homogenous county (or small group of counties) can act as a complete
veto point.
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who voted in the most recent general election.194 In 2013, however,
after a popular referendum vetoed legislation regarding education,195
the state legislature enacted a law requiring signatures to come from 6
percent of voters in each of at least eighteen of Idaho’s 35 senate
districts.196 After voters nonetheless succeeded in expanding Medicaid
by ballot initiative, the legislature moved to increase the distributional
requirements.197 The new law required signatures from 6 percent of
voters in each of the state’s 35 senate districts (and collection within an
18-month period).198 Critics say the law made it “virtually impossible
for grassroots organizations to qualify initiatives and referendums for
the ballot.”199 As Part III describes, the Idaho Supreme Court recently
struck down the law as a violation of the state’s constitutional
establishment of direct democracy.
Other states have followed a similar pattern. When initiatives pass
or threaten to pass, legislatures have worked to make future initiatives
harder to pass, including by ratcheting up distribution requirements.
Missouri, for example, is among a half-dozen states that have used
voter referendums to expand Medicaid, “circumventing opposition by
state lawmakers or governors by going straight to the ballot box.”200
After voters approved the constitutional amendment, the Missouri
legislature refused to allocate additional funding for the expansion of
the state’s program, and the governor’s office refused to implement

194. See Rebecca Boone, Idaho Supreme Court Weighs New Strict Ballot Initiatives Law,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 29, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/id-state-wire-idaho-supreme-co
urt-idaho-voting-rights-courts-6bacd760b45af96a5318b0b93d99bc00 [https://perma.cc/DS9G-78HM].
195. Id.
196. See Isbelle v. Denney, No. 1:19-cv-00093-DCN, 2020 WL 2841886, at *1 (D. Idaho June
1, 2020) (discussing and upholding the amendment to Idaho Code Section 34-1805).
197. See Boone, supra note 194.
198. Id.; IDAHO CODE § 34-1805(2) (2021).
199. Reclaim Idaho Files Lawsuit To Strike Down Anti-Initiatives Law, KTVB (May 7, 2021,
4:52 PM), https://www.ktvb.com/article/news/local/capitol-watch/reclaim-idaho-files-lawsuit-tostrike-down-anti-initiatives-law/277-e9351938-6047-43f0-bca7-db3b667df241 [https://perma.cc/G
5ZS-HZRR]; Doug Petcash, Idaho Supreme Court To Hear Arguments on Controversial New
Ballot Initiative Law, KTVB (June 27, 2021, 11:08 AM) https://www.ktvb.com/article/news/local/
viewpoint/viewpoint-idaho-supreme-court-ballot-initiative-law/277-711ff1bf-70f5-4d4f-b504-bdc
b34e2090b [https://perma.cc/FY6E-YLGU] (“Opponents argue the law makes it virtually impossible
to get an initiative on the ballot.”).
200. Sarah Kliff, Missouri’s Medicaid Expansion Is on Again, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (July
30, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/23/upshot/missouris-medicaid-expansion-is-on-agai
n.html [https://perma.cc/8EMJ-XDKB].

SEIFTER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

DEMOCRATIC OPPORTUNITY

10/16/2022 11:35 AM

315

it.201 But Missouri’s Supreme Court unanimously rejected that
recalcitrance. Without mandating future legislative appropriations, the
court held that the state was required to begin enrolling newly qualified
individuals into the (already funded) program just as it would enroll
previously-eligible participants.202 The governor has agreed to comply,
but the legislature is now considering reining in the initiative in other
ways, including by increasing distribution “requirements to 10 percent
from each congressional district for constitutional amendments and 5
percent for petitions aiming to change state law.”203
A similar story of ballot initiative success and pro-districting
reaction has played out in Michigan. In Michigan in 2018—the same
year that ballot initiatives approved an independent legislative
redistricting commission, legalized recreational marijuana, and
established state constitutional voting rights204—the legislature
attempted to create a geographically-based burden on future
initiatives. Rather than requiring a certain number of signatures from
every district, this limit was styled differently. It established a cap of 15
percent on the signatures that could come “from any [one]
congressional district.”205 The Michigan Court of Claims and Michigan
Court of Appeals rejected this requirement as unconstitutional. The
court of appeals concluded that the cap “violate[d] the rights of
Michigan electors to participate in the electoral process by potentially
excluding some from the petition process.”206 The court reasoned that
the state constitution granted voters a self-executing right to
participate in the petition process and the legislature lacked the power
to burden that right. The court concluded that the 15 percent cap would
be a burden because “[i]ts effect would be to unconditionally deny

201. Id.; see also Brian Hauswirth, Parson: Missouri Will Follow Judge’s Order on Medicaid
Expansion, MISSOURINET (Aug. 11, 2021), https://www.missourinet.com/2021/08/11/parson-miss
ouri-will-follow-judges-order-on-medicaid-expansion-audio [https://perma.cc/V32M-4PEC].
202. Doyle v. Tidball, 625 S.W.3d 459, 467 (Mo. 2021).
203. Liz Crampton & Mona Zhang, The Next Republican Target: Ballot Campaigns,
POLITICO (July 21, 2021, 4:30 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/07/21/republicans-ballotcampaigns-voting-rights-500347 [https://perma.cc/H2J9-7KY4].
204. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
205. 2018 Mich. Pub. Acts 608 (providing that “[n]ot more than 15% of the signatures to be
used to determine the validity of a petition described in this section shall be of registered electors
from any [one] congressional district”).
206. League of Women Voters of Mich. v. Sec’y of State, 952 N.W.2d 491, 507 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2020), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 957 N.W.2d 731 (Mich. 2020).
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untold numbers of registered voters the right to have their signatures
counted” and “[t]hat the process would be more difficult was
unrebutted below, where the League of Women Voters filed affidavits
with the Court of Claims detailing the myriad increased time and cost
burdens imposed by the 15 percent geographic requirement.”207 The
Michigan Supreme Court vacated that holding due to standing and
mootness issues208 but recently reached the same conclusion on the
merits in a separate case.209
B. Other Burdens on Direct Democracy
Direct democracy can be burdened by methods other than
geographic requirements or districting. In recent years, state
legislatures have employed additional tactics. According to a study by
the Ballot Initiative Strategy Center, “146 bills intended to change the
ballot measure process” were introduced in the 2021 legislative
session.210 Twenty-four of those bills were signed into law.211 Legislative
and constitutional proposals to burden or constrain ballot initiatives
continue in 2022212—and seem unlikely to abate.
As with the geographic burdens discussed above, these measures
are often presented as good for democracy. In particular, proponents
of these new measures argue for more “integrity in the process,”213
especially in light of “the influence of out-of-state interest groups”214 in

207. Id. at 508–09.
208. League of Women Voters of Mich., 957 N.W.2d at 751.
209. See League of Women Voters of Mich. v. Sec’y of State, 975 N.W.2d 840, 854, 858 (Mich.
2022).
210. See
Attacks
and
Threats,
BALLOT
INITIATIVE
STRATEGY
CTR.,
https://ballot.org/attacks-threats [https://perma.cc/QD27-ESNA]; see also Reid Epstein & Nick
Corasaniti, Republicans Move To Limit a Grass-Roots Tradition of Direct Democracy, N.Y.
TIMES (May 22, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/22/us/politics/republican-ballot-initi
atives-democrats.html [https://perma.cc/Z9JT-QGLR] (“In three states, Republican lawmakers
have asked voters to approve ballot initiatives that in fact limit their own right to bring and pass
future ballot initiatives.”).
211. Attacks and Threats, supra note 210.
212. See id. (noting, for example, that the Missouri legislature “has introduced nearly two
dozen attacks on the initiative process as of March 1, 2022”).
213. Crampton & Zhang, supra note 203.
214. Id.
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ballot campaigns, which in turn may not “truly represent the interest
of voters.”215
This line of argument has some basis in reality: ballot initiatives
are high-dollar affairs, and someone must fund them. That alone does
not necessarily differentiate them from campaigns for elected office,
which can also be expensive and funded by dollars that flow in from
out of state.216 But there are examples of campaigns bankrolled by
industry groups or national-level organizers that appear to astroturf
their way to success.217 Measures to uphold the “integrity” of ballot
initiatives are, in the abstract, a good idea.
Still, it seems unlikely that many of the restrictions imposed match
the threat of fraudulent signatures or astroturf campaigns. South
Dakota’s new laws illustrate this. The proponents who organized the
Medicaid initiative in Missouri have qualified Medicaid expansion for
the ballot in South Dakota in November 2022218; another group
proposed an amendment creating an independent redistricting
commission, but it will not appear on the ballot.219 South Dakota law
already required initiative proponents to fit all of their signatures onto
a single “self-contained sheet of paper printed front and back,”
supposedly to avoid fraud.220 That drove proponents to use tiny
writing.221 A new law now requires the font of the petition to be at least
14-point, thus requiring bedsheet-sized pieces of paper.222 This format
is cumbersome and raises the expense and difficulty of a campaign; its
215. Id.
216. See supra note 115.
217. For a recent critique in the context of ballot initiatives governing employment
designations for gig workers, see Terri Gerstein, In Massachusetts, A Limit on Gig Companies’
Deceptions, AM. PROSPECT (June 17, 2022), https://prospect.org/justice/in-massachusetts-limiton-gig-companies-deceptions [https://perma.cc/CCN9-P832] (stating that “[i]n California, gig
companies spent over $200 million to blanket the state in pro-Proposition 22 advertising, create
astroturf (fake grassroots) groups to show support, and generally tried to fill the airwaves in order
to prevent people from understanding what the ballot initiative actually meant”).
218. See Our Ballot Measure Campaigns, FAIRNESS PROJECT, https://thefairnessproject.org/
ballot-measure-campaigns [https://perma.cc/334T-NH5Z]; see also Kliff, supra note 200.
219. Seth Tupper, Republican-Backed Bills Complicate Citizen Lawmaking, S.D. PUB.
BROAD. (Mar. 11, 2021), https://www.sdpb.org/blogs/politics-public-policy/republicanbacked-bil
ls-complicate-citizen-lawmaking [https://perma.cc/4HV4-CQP4].
220. S.D. ADMIN. R. 5:02:08:00.01(b) (2019).
221. Tupper, supra note 219.
222. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 2-1-1.2(1) (2021); see Tupper, supra note 219 (including an image
of such paper).
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enhancement of “integrity” seems doubtful. It may instead be a tell
that legislators are unsupportive of direct democracy.223
Mississippi’s new limits on the initiative process sound in a more
legalistic register. In 2021, the state’s supreme court struck down the
initiative process altogether while reviewing an initiative that would
have legalized medical marijuana.224 The state constitution’s initiative
provision, adopted in 1992, specifies that the requisite signatures for a
ballot initiative must come equally from all five of the state’s
congressional districts.225 But in the wake of the 2000 census,
Mississippi went down to four congressional districts. In a feat of
formalism,226 the court concluded that this rendered the signature
collection process, and thus the ballot initiative process, unworkable in
the state unless the constitution is amended.227
C. Power Stripping
In addition to districting and burdening direct democracy, a third
threat to state majoritarian institutions comes from measures that
transfer power to more minoritarian institutions—typically, from
governors or other elected executive officials to the legislative
leadership or its preferred designees. I consider two prominent
examples: power-stripping in connection with election administration
and pandemic response. Like the other measures discussed here, these

223. Tupper, supra note 219 (quoting a legislator stating during the legislative debate that
“[w]e started out as a republic” but that “[s]adly, we’re tending in the direction of a democracy.
And that democracy was only intended to be going to the polls to vote for your elected representative.”).
224. See Initiative Measure No. 65: Mayor Butler v. Watson, 338 So. 3d 599, 602, 615 (Miss.
2021).
225. The text:
An initiative to amend the Constitution may be proposed by a petition signed over a
twelve-month period by qualified electors equal in number to at least twelve percent
(12%) of the votes for all candidates for Governor in the last gubernatorial election.
The signatures of the qualified electors from any congressional district shall not exceed
one-fifth (1/5) of the total number of signatures required to qualify an initiative petition
for placement upon the ballot.
MISS. CONST. § 273(3).
226. For commentary, see Michael C. Dorf, The Absurd Formalism of the Mississippi
Supreme Court, DORF ON L. (June 8, 2021, 8:55 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2021/06/theabsurd-formalism-of-mississippi.html [https://perma.cc/VBV7-9MZW].
227. See Initiative Measure No. 65, 338 So. 3d at 615 (“[T]he drafters of section 273(3) wrote
a ballot-initiative process that cannot work in a world where Mississippi has fewer than five
representatives in Congress. To work in today’s reality, it will need amending—something that
lies beyond the power of the Supreme Court.”).
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measures have plausible defenses, and their proponents often invoke
ideas about democracy.
The normative significance of these power shifts is more
complicated than in the previous examples, for a few reasons. First, as
I discuss in Part III, not all limitations on executive power raise
democratic concerns. Second, these shifts raise a set of concerns
beyond democracy. When it comes to election administration and
pandemic response, majority rule may not be the most important
frame. The greater problem in the examples that follow, and related
examples not listed here, may be that legislatures politicized election
administration and pandemic response, not that the tasks were shifted
away from majoritarian institutions. Indeed, there are persuasive
arguments for taking at least some of these matters outside the realm
of elected officials.
That said, in some instances discussed below, the shift from
majority to minority control of elections and emergency response and
the shift toward more partisan election and emergency administration
seem to be traveling together.228 When viewed as part of the larger
whole, they fit into a pattern of impeding states’ role as safeguards of
majority rule. Moreover, the election examples showcase a different
type of antimajoritarian behavior: the recruitment of election
administrators or officials with stated a willingness to install candidates
who received a minority of votes and lost the election. The examples
thus underscore that unless governors, state courts, and ballot
initiatives remain a “seawall,” it will be difficult to assure that these
important matters reflect the popular will.229

228. For example, Professor Richard L. Hasen has explained how the threat that voters’
actual preferences will not be honored in the 2024 election is tied to the replacement of existing
election officials “by those who may not have allegiance to the integrity of the election system.”
See Hasen, supra note 8, at 266.
229. It is possible to describe these developments as antidemocratic in other ways. In
pandemic response, limitations on the power to respond to public health and other emergencies
remove vital state “capacity” that implicates democracy because “around the world, the fortunes
of liberal democracy rise and fall with its perceived effectiveness in improving the lives of ordinary
people.” Brink Lindsey, State Capacity: What Is It, How We Lost It, and How To Get It Back,
NISKANEN CTR. (Nov. 18, 2021), https://www.niskanencenter.org/state-capacity-what-is-it-howwe-lost-it-and-how-to-get-it-back [https://perma.cc/6GEM-SYX5]. Although both of these lines
of argument deserve attention, they are not my focus here.
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1. Election Administration. In 2021, states enacted myriad changes
to their election administration laws. Perhaps the most well-known of
these laws apply to the process of voting and pertain to matters such as
ballot boxes, voter ID, and the process for distributing ballots. But an
important set of laws—resulting from 262 bills introduced as of
December 2021, per one study230—address who runs elections and who
certifies the results.231 These results have largely shifted authority away
from state governors and secretaries of state and to the state legislature
or its partisan designees.232
In Kansas, two new laws, enacted over gubernatorial veto, change
who oversees elections. First, House Bill 2332 removes power from the
governor (currently a Democrat) to modify election administration or
procedures and also divests the judiciary of “any authority to modify
the state election laws.”233 In addition, it forbids the secretary of state
from entering into any agreement or consent decree regarding election
laws or procedures in state or federal court without “specific approval”
from the legislature or legislative coordinating council, both controlled
by Republicans.234 A second bill, House Bill 2183, changes procedures
for mail-in voting, including by removing the secretary of state’s
authority to extend the deadline for the receipt of advance voting

230. See STATES UNITED REPORT DECEMBER 2021 UPDATE, supra note 147, at 2.
231. See Quinn Scanlan, 10 New State Laws Shift Power over Elections to Partisan Entities,
ABC NEWS (Aug. 16, 2021, 2:29 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/dozen-state-laws-shiftpower-elections-partisan-entities/story?id=79408455 [https://perma.cc/2GG2-HAR9] (identifying “at
least eight states, including battlegrounds Arizona and Georgia, that have enacted 10 laws so far
this year that change election laws by bolstering partisan entities’ power over the process or
shifting election-related responsibilities from secretaries of state”); STATES UNITED REPORT
DECEMBER 2021 UPDATE, supra note 147, at 1–2.
232. Nicholas Riccardi, Slow-Motion Insurrection: How the GOP Seizes Election Power,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 30, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-united-stateselections-electoral-college-election-2020-809215812f4bc6e5907573ba98247c0c [https://perma.cc/DYS9A2AV] (“Trump has been clear about his intentions: He is seeking to oust statewide officials who
stood in his way and replace them with allies.”).
233. See H.B. 2332, 2021–22 Leg., Reg. Sess., 2021 Kan. Sess. Laws 1115–23; KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-125(b) (2021).
234. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-125(c) (2021); State Partisan Composition, NAT’L CONF. OF
STATE LEGISLATURES (June 1, 2022), https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/
partisan-composition.aspx [https://perma.cc/JW3X-PP5K] (showing Republican control of the
Kansas legislature in 2021); Legislative Coordinating Council, KAN. STATE LEGISLATURE, http://
www.kslegislature.org/li/b2021_22/committees/ctte_lcc_1/ [https://perma.cc/TPE9-HV22] (listing
eight committee members, six of whom are Republicans).
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ballots.235 Legislative proponents of the law emphasized the
importance that the legislature be the branch that controls elections.236
Similar laws have passed in Kentucky and Montana. The Montana law
forbids a governor from changing election procedures without
legislative approval,237 while Kentucky’s Senate Bill 1 (enacted over the
governor’s veto, despite extensive bipartisan cooperation on election
administration more generally238) precludes the governor and secretary
of state from collaborating in an emergency to revise election
requirements without legislative approval.239
Or take Georgia. Georgia’s razor-thin political margins have
dominated national media, as did former President Trump’s failed plea
to Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger to “find” just over 11,000
votes to flip the election results.240 The Georgia legislature’s response,
which altered state elections in a number of ways, included a powerstripping provision.241 It demotes the secretary of state to an “ex
officio” role on the state’s Board of Elections, replacing the secretary
with a chair to be selected by the General Assembly.242 This change
does not necessarily alter the partisan affiliation of the Board or its
235. H.B. 2183, 2021–22 Leg., Reg. Sess., 2021 Kan. Sess. Laws 1107–14 § 7(b).
236. Katie Bernard, ‘Voter Suppression’: Kansas Lawmakers Advance Election Law Changes,
KAN. CITY STAR (Apr. 1, 2021, 4:16 PM), https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-govern
ment/election/article250349886.html [https://perma.cc/DL9C-FLY5] (quoting Representative
Blake Carpenter’s statement that “[d]uring the 2020 election cycle we saw a few issues with the
other branches of government altering election laws and, in my opinion, doing so illegally”).
237. H.B. 429, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess., 2021 Mont. Laws 1318–19 § 2(4).
238. H.B. 574, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess., 2021 Ky. Laws 1435–1505; Adam Brewster & Caitlin
Huey-Burns, How GOP-Dominant Kentucky Passed Bipartisan Election Reforms, CBS NEWS
(Mar. 31. 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/kentucky-election-reforms-bipartisan
[https://perma.cc/8WHE-H2FR].
239. See S.B. 1, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess., 2021 Ky. Laws 18–26; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
39A.090(4) (2021); see After Veto Overrides, Beshear Sues Kentucky Republican Leaders To
Maintain Emergency Powers, WDRB (Dec. 30, 2021), https://www.wdrb.com/news/after-vetooverrides-beshear-sues-kentucky-republican-leaders-to-maintain-emergency-powers/article_5ce
b542a-65af-11eb-ac89-5381cd7838ec.html [https://perma.cc/2H7R-VYST].
240. See Gardner, supra note 120.
241. Zack Beauchamp, Georgia’s Restrictive New Voting Law, Explained, VOX (Mar. 26,
2021,
2:40
PM),
https://www.vox.com/22352112/georgia-voting-sb-202-explained
[https://perma.cc/RN6P-2UWZ]; Aaron Blake, 2 Secretaries of State Undercut Trump’s Fraud
Claims in Key, GOP-Controlled States. Republicans Have Now Voted To Strip Both of Power,
WASH. POST (June 26, 2021, 10:02 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/05/27/
gops-brazen-move-strip-power-fraud-narrative-busting-secretary-state-again [https://perma.cc/2
QNS-ZN54].
242. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-30(d) (2021).
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leadership, much less portend a subverted election. But it is possible
that the Republican candidate who wins statewide in a closely divided
state, like Raffensperger, is more moderate than the chair that will be
appointed by the legislative majority, who might be a partisan actor
willing to meddle in election results. That possibility, at least, seems to
be the sort of scenario that has Professor Richard Hasen scared that
“[e]lection officials are being put in place who will mess with the
count.”243
Arizona’s power-stripping law is different, at least at face value.
By transferring power from the secretary of state to the attorney
general, it seems to merely transfer power from one majoritarian
official to another.244 Scrutinized more closely, however, the law
achieves an effect closer to Georgia’s. That is because the change only
remains in place until January 2, 2023245; both the attorney general and
secretary of state are up for reelection in fall 2022. This change, like the
others, fits the general mold of the legislature clawing back power from
an elected official with whom it disagrees and diverting it to its own
partisan agent. Another legislative proposal in the state, not enacted at
the time of this writing, would transfer authority over the state’s
Elections Procedures Manual to a legislative committee rather than the
governor and secretary of state.246
Again, the argument here is not that majoritarian election
administration is necessarily or consistently virtuous, especially when

243. See Jane Mayer, The Big Money Behind the Big Lie, NEW YORKER (Aug. 2, 2021)
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/08/09/the-big-money-behind-the-big-lie [https://per
ma.cc/25GW-PVUR] (quoting Hasen).
244. See Elise Viebeck, Arizona Poised To Enact New Election Restrictions, Strip Power from
Democratic Secretary of State, WASH. POST (June 25, 2021, 2:47 PM), https://www.washington
post.com/politics/arizona-trump-election-voting/2021/06/25/82de055c-d5c5-11eb-a53a-3b5450fdc
a7a_story.html [https://perma.cc/YWQ7-3R3J]; Ben Giles, Arizona Republicans Strip Some
Election Power from Democratic Secretary of State, NPR (June 30, 2021, 7:55 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2021/06/30/1011154122/arizona-republicans-strip-some-election-power-from
-democratic-secretary-of-state [https://perma.cc/D243-M5EL].
245. S.B. 1819, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2021).
246. See S.B. 1068, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2021); see also STATES UNITED
DEMOCRACY CTR., DEMOCRACY CRISIS REPORT UPDATE: NEW DATA AND TRENDS SHOW
THE WARNING SIGNS HAVE INTENSIFIED IN THE LAST TWO MONTHS 3 (2021) [hereinafter
STATES UNITED REPORT JUNE 2021 UPDATE] (discussing the proposal). Yet another proposed
law, House Bill 2800, would mandate a special legislative session after each election, H.B. 2800,
55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2021), leading to a scenario in which the legislature “potentially
overturn[s] the result.” STATES UNITED REPORT JUNE 2021 UPDATE, supra, at 3.
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compared to nonpartisan administration. But majoritarian state o
officials provide counterweights against minority rule, and state
legislatures are dismantling them in favor of preferred, and potentially
partisan, agents.247
2. Emergency and Public Health Powers. Outside of the elections
context, almost all states have proposed laws limiting executive branch
power in the wake of states’ COVID-19 responses, and more than half
of the states have enacted such laws.248 One recent article captures the
phenomenon as “COVID[-19]’s counterpunch”: “aggressive efforts by
numerous state legislatures to diminish state and local public health
emergency powers.”249 The authors trace “[c]onsiderable . . .
influence” over the new state laws to draft legislation from the
American Legislative Exchange Council.250
To be clear, reflecting on the appropriate scope of executive
power after a crisis is a good idea.251 As Professor Lindsay Wiley has
written, a “key tension” in public health is “between expertise-driven
regulation and democratic governance,” and sound policy makes space
for both.252 Invoking Professor Bonnie Honig, Wiley observes “that
emergencies do not, and should not, obviate the fact that there is ‘no

247. See Riccardi, supra note 232 (examining the local and national responses to former
President Trump’s election fraud claims).
248. For tallies, see Legislative Oversight of Emergency Executive Powers, NAT’L CONF. OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/legislative-oversig
ht-of-executive-orders.aspx#Emergency%20Powers%20Bills [https://perma.cc/4XHH-V4LG] and
Sophie Quinton, Lawmakers Move To Strip Governors’ Emergency Powers, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Jan. 22, 2021), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2021/01/22/la
wmakers-move-to-strip-governors-emergency-powers [https://perma.cc/SYK2-HA8Z]. For context,
see America Debates How Much Power State Governors Should Have, ECONOMIST (June 19,
2021), https://www.economist.com/united-states/2021/06/17/america-debates-how-much-power-s
tate-governors-should-have [https://perma.cc/49LZ-QCKA].
249. James G. Hodge, Jr. & Jennifer Piatt, Covid’s Counterpunch: State Legislative Assaults
on Public Health Emergency Powers, 36 BYU J. PUB. L. 31, 31 (2022).
250. See id. at 38 (citing Emergency Power Limitation Act, AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL (Jan.
8, 2021), https://www.alec.org/model-policy/emergency-power-limitation-act [https://perma.cc/
XJ6R-NJ7U]).
251. See America Debates How Much Power State Governors Should Have, supra note 248.
252. Lindsay F. Wiley, Democratizing the Law of Social Distancing, 19 YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 50, 120 (2020).
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getting away from the need in a democracy for the people to
decide.’”253
And some adjustments of emergency power that state legislatures
have approved seem like democratically neutral developments,
whether or not one may object to them on policy grounds. Several
states have imposed a consultation requirement before a governor may
declare or continue a state of emergency or impose emergency
orders.254 Others have required documentation of the costs associated
with emergency responses.255 Still others have adjusted the permissible
time period for an emergency response or required the legislature to
approve extensions once an emergency is declared.256
Other state legislative developments, however, seem to close off
majority rule in the people’s name. While purporting to defend the
interests of the people, these laws transfer a core executive function
from a popularly elected governor, typically in the form of a publicly
supported emergency response, to a different body—often one that is
either less majoritarian, has vowed to reject even widely supported
emergency responses, or both.
Kentucky has been a hotspot for such efforts. The state legislature
there has “reshaped state government during this year’s legislative
session, limiting [Governor] Andy Beshear’s powers while shifting
authority to the legislature and state offices currently controlled by
Republicans.”257 In connection with the COVID-19 pandemic, the

253. Id. at 58 n.19 (quoting BONNIE HONIG, EMERGENCY POLITICS: PARADOX, LAW,
DEMOCRACY 3 (2009)).
254. See, e.g., H.B. 1426, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2020) (requiring the governor
to provide information and answer questions from legislative committees with respect to any
current disaster emergency and to give the general assembly notice of promulgation of any
executive order in connection with disaster emergency).
255. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 26.23.025 (2022).
256. S.B. 105, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2021 N.C. Sess. Laws 180 (allowing the North
Carolina Council of State to extend emergency declarations from 30 days to 60, at which time
only the legislature may extend declaration by enactment of general law).
257. See Ryland Barton, Kentucky Lawmakers Shift Power Away from Governor, WFPL
(Mar. 31, 2021), https://wfpl.org/kentucky-lawmakers-shift-power-away-from-governor [https://
perma.cc/J98H-Z7LB]; Nick Niedzwiadek, The End of the Imperial Governorship, POLITICO
(Apr. 14, 2021), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/04/14/governors-power-coronavirus-479386
[https://perma.cc/3G7R-9LPA] (“One of the first things on the agenda . . . for Kentucky Republicans
was figuring out how to kneecap Democratic Gov. Andy Beshear. They dropped legislation in
January that placed new limits on the governor’s emergency executive powers, quickly passed the
bill, overrode his veto and then fought him in court.”).
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legislature enacted three statutes,258 over the governor’s veto, that curb
gubernatorial power. The three laws ended Beshear’s existing
COVID-19-related closures and prohibited future ones, instead
requiring businesses to comply with the “least restrictive” applicable
federal guidelines259; putting a 30-day cap on future emergency orders
absent legislative extension260; and empowering a legislative committee
to veto non-emergency administrative regulations, while also limiting
the scope, duration, and basis of emergency regulations.261 These
orders were part of a pattern of other legislative divestments of
Beshear’s power. In other laws in the same session, the legislature
shifted power over other matters—enforcing abortion regulations,
cancelling state contracts, and spending federal relief funds—from
Beshear or Democratic officials reporting to him and placed it within
the legislature itself or Republican officials.262
The Kentucky example (and others in purple states, such as
Pennsylvania and Michigan) reflect predictable interparty tension. But
executive power-stripping has also occurred in states controlled by a
single party, such as New York and Ohio. Both legislatures limited the
governor’s authority to act unilaterally in issuing emergency or public
health orders.263 The Ohio law, Senate Bill 22, empowers the legislature
or a new, constitutionally dubious, Republican-led Ohio Health
Oversight and Advisory Committee to rescind any health order by an
executive branch official264 and precludes local health authorities from

258. H.B. 1, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2021) (permitting schools and businesses to stay open
as long as they follow CDC guidance, notwithstanding governor’s orders); S.B. 1, 2021 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Ky. 2021) (capping governor’s emergency orders at 30 days unless legislature extends
them); S.B. 2, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2021) (granting legislature oversight authority over
emergency administrative orders, which are also subject to public comment); see Barton, supra
note 257.
259. H.B. 1, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2021).
260. S.B. 1, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2021).
261. S.B. 2, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2021); see Cameron v. Beshear, 628 S.W.3d 61, 75 (Ky.
2021) (explaining that “even though a legislative committee may find that a regulation is ‘deficient,’
the regulation at issue remains in the purview of the executive branch as to what is to become of
the ‘deficient regulation’”).
262. Barton, supra note 257.
263. See Niedzwiadek, supra note 257. In New York, Senate Bill 5357 and Assembly Bill 5967
repealed the emergency power that had been granted to the governor in Senate Bill 7919. The bill
also added legislative authority to “terminate . . . a state disaster emergency . . . by concurrent
resolution.” 18 EXEC. 2-B § 28(5).
264. S.B. 22, 134th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., § 101.36 (Ohio 2021).
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issuing health mandates that apply to individuals who have not been
diagnosed with a contagious disease.265 It has left Ohio cities, for
example, powerless to require unvaccinated students to wear masks,
even when the majority of Americans266 and Ohioans267 supported such
a measure. In vetoing Senate Bill 22, Republican Governor Mike
DeWine said that the bill “jeopardizes the safety of every Ohioan” by
stripping public health officials of their “ability to move quickly to
protect the public from the most serious emergencies Ohio could
face.”268 Supporters of the Ohio law defended it as returning power to
the people.269
Although I focus here on the direct actions of state legislatures,
state courts, too, have participated in shifting executive power to
(gerrymandered) state legislatures. While most state courts rejected
challenges to governors’ initial emergency actions,270 others invoked
novel constitutional or statutory grounds to strike them down.
Wisconsin’s Supreme Court held that statewide public health orders
were rules that required a rulemaking process271—a seemingly neutral
requirement were it not for a state legislative committee’s unusual,

265. Id. §§ 3707.11, 3707.54; see Jake Zuckerman, New State Law Blocks Ohio’s Largest City
from Mask Mandate, Official Says, OHIO CAP. J. (Aug. 6, 2021, 12:55 AM), https://ohiocap
italjournal.com/2021/08/06/new-state-law-blocks-ohios-largest-county-from-mask-mandate-offici
al-says [https://perma.cc/DW45-JA85].
266. See, e.g., Chris Jackson, Mallory Newall, James Diamond & Jocelyn Duran, America
Remains on Pause as Omicron Continues, IPSOS (Jan. 25, 2022), https://www.ipsos.com/enus/news-polls/axios-ipsos-coronavirus-index [https://perma.cc/33GX-J6YA] (finding that 66 percent
of Americans oppose state laws that prohibit local governments from creating mask
requirements).
267. See Mallory Newall & Sara Machi, Most Ohio Residents Approve of Governor’s Job and
Support Extensive COVID-19 Regulations, IPSOS (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.ipsos.com/enus/news-polls/spectrumnetworks-statepolling-OH [https://perma.cc/J2VE-63QX] (reporting that
61 percent of Ohioans support mask mandates).
268. Statement of Governor Mike DeWine, Veto Message: Statement of the Reasons for the
Veto of Substitute Senate Bill 22, at 1 (Mar. 23, 2021), https://content.govdelivery.com/att
achments/OHOOD/2021/03/23/file_attachments/1732100/SB%2022%20Veto%20Message.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6W3C-Y4MG].
269. See, e.g., Mike McCarthy & Jarrod Clay, Ohio Senate, House Override Gov. DeWine’s
Veto of Health Order Bill, ABC 6 (Mar. 24, 2021), https://abc6onyourside.com/news/local/ohiosenate-bill-22-override-vote-3-24-21 [https://perma.cc/JK9X-Q7AL] (reporting on statement of
Ohio Senator Matt Huffman).
270. See, e.g., Desrosiers v. Governor of Mass., 158 N.E.3d 827, 847 (Mass. 2020).
271. Wis. Legislature v. Palm, 942 N.W.2d 900, 918 (Wis. 2020).
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minoritarian veto over rulemaking.272 Michigan’s Supreme Court
dusted off the nondelegation doctrine, which had never been used to
strike down an entire statute, to invalidate an emergency powers
statute that had been on the books for decades.273
*

*

*

Again, not all diminishments of executive power are bad, and
election administration and pandemic response need not be
majoritarian through and through. But we should at least be mindful
of what concentrating legislative power typically does: it moves power
away from the official chosen by the entire electorate and towards a
body that is more prone to minoritarian bias. In that sense, it fits within
the broader trend this Article describes.
III. STRUCTURAL TAILORING AND MAJORITY CONSTRAINT
Parts I and II have shown that state institutions provide
opportunities to limit national democratic decline, while recent
developments threaten, instead, to accelerate it. One might expect
stern condemnation of these attacks, followed by galvanized
opposition to them. That has not happened. Instead, these threats to
majority rule swirl in the same Janus-faced eddy of democracy
discourse more broadly, in which it is uncertain whether majority rule
is friend or foe.274 Democracy is hard to talk about clearly, especially at
the sound bite level. And as Part II shows, opportunists can exploit this
ambiguity by undermining majority rule under misleading pretenses.
Greater clarity is possible. Although many features of democracy
will remain contested, this Part identifies several recurring mistakes, or
sleights of hand, that democracy discourse can reject. Each

272. See Andrew C. Cook, Extraordinary Session Laws: New Limits on Governor and
Attorney General, WIS. LAW. (May 17, 2019), https://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/Wiscon
sinLawyer/Pages/Article.aspx?Volume=92&Issue=5&ArticleID=27014 [https://perma.cc/6YMQ
-CS42]; Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Loc. 1 v. Vos, 946 N.W.2d 35, 59 (Wis. 2020) (rejecting a facial
challenge to a statutory provision allowing the legislative committee to suspend an administrative
rule multiple times, but stating that “there exists at least some required end point after which
bicameral passage and presentment to the governor must occur”).
273. In re Certified Questions from U.S. Dist. Ct., 958 N.W.2d 1, 16–25 (Mich. 2020).
274. See Wilentz, supra note 17 (“Liberals have been raised on warnings about the tyranny
of the majority, and have prided themselves, quite rightly, on their commitment to the protection
of minorities.”).
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overestimates the risks inherent in majority rule and underestimates
the risks that spring from minority rule. These ill-conceived proposals
would replace majoritarian institutions with full-blown minoritarian
ones; impose strong constraints on majority rule without justification
other than an ordinary political loss; and cause, rather than solve, key
problems associated with majority rule.
Part III.A zooms out and begins with foundational principles:
there can be no meaningful democracy without both majority rule and
political equality. But there is no necessary tension between the two,
contrary to recent rhetoric and age-old worries,. Discrimination against
vulnerable groups and entrenchment are two core threats to political
equality. Whether majority rule or majority constraint is more likely to
produce these harms will always be contingent on underlying social and
political factors.
If we cannot simply cast state majoritarian institutions as blanket
threats to political equality, how should we evaluate constraints on
them? Part III.B introduces the idea of structural tailoring. Just as
courts impose tiers of scrutiny or other balancing inquiries in the
context of rights, institutional designers and reformers may be more or
less tolerant of different majoritarian impediments in the domain of
structure. A wide array of “weak” constraints might enrich majority
rule without harming political equality or democratic principles. But
“strong” constraints typically require a political-equality justification,
and they fare worst when they create the problems they claim to solve.
This basic framework highlights the recurring mistakes that recent
state-level reforms make.
Part III.C revisits the recent developments from Part II through
this framework. Many of Part II’s developments involve a mismatch
between problem and remedy. While reforms that durably invert
majority rule are virtually never warranted, making ballot initiatives
functionally impossible, gerrymandering judicial districts, and stripping
(rather than disciplining) executive power in favor of a gerrymandered
legislature could do just that. Other proposals, imposing only weak
constraints, do not raise red flags on normative democratic analysis,
though scholars properly debate them on other important policy
grounds.
While the discussion in this Part is necessarily abbreviated, its aim
is to impose sufficient discipline to avoid excessive faith in majority rule
while also rejecting antidemocratic behavior cloaked in democracytalk. Many of today’s invocations of the “excesses of democracy” are
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utterly divorced from the good reasons that do exist for constraining
majorities.
A. Why Constrain Majority (or Minority) Power?
I begin this discussion with a widely shared premise, mentioned
earlier: there can be no democracy without some form of both majority
rule and political equality.275 Whether one agrees that majority rule is
“the truest source of political legitimacy”276 or merely a formal but
insufficient requirement,277 majority rule is the central pillar of most
definitions of democracy, alongside two others: political equality and
popular sovereignty.278
Some recent proposals, drawing on a long tradition, depict
majority rule as naturally at odds with political equality. In arguing that
majorities may “trammel the interests of minorities”279 or act
tyrannically,280 those seeking to transform state majoritarian
institutions echo an intellectual thread in U.S. constitutional discourse,
from Madison forward, that fears majoritarian excess.281 Such fears
275. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 34 (1956) [hereafter
DAHL, PREFACE] (“Running through the whole history of democratic theories is the
identification of ‘democracy’ with political equality, popular sovereignty, and rule by
majorities.”).
276. Wilentz, supra note 17.
277. See, e.g., Bowie, supra note 12, at 168–69. I include in this group theorists who would
allow minority interests to control or to wield power in some circumstances. See, e.g., LANI
GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE
DEMOCRACY 4–6 (1994); Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public
Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1863–67 (2019).
278. See Bulman-Pozen & Seifter, supra note 31, at 860–61, 880 (gathering sources).
279. See Reclaim Idaho v. Denney, 497 P.3d 160, 188 (Idaho 2021) (describing arguments of
the state legislature in defending a statute burdening the ballot initiative process).
280. See supra Part II.C.2 (analyzing opposition to gubernatorial power).
281. Madison’s fear of majority faction animated his defense of the structure of an extended
republic and the separation of powers. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison); see also
JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 290 (1996) (explaining Madison’s view of the need to
“defend minorities and individuals against factious popular majorities acting through
government”). Praise abounds for the “genius” of this approach, but, as Ely wrote, “it didn’t take
long to learn that from the standpoint of protecting minorities it was not enough.” ELY, supra
note 35, at 80–81. Other disciplines, too, have explored majority rule’s potential harms. For one
helpful compilation bridging law, political science, and philosophy, see MAJORITIES AND
MINORITIES: NOMOS XXXII, at 24, 32 (John W. Chapman & Alan Wertheimer eds., 1990).
Political theorist Philip Pettit, for example, posits that majority rule “may represent the most
serious threat of all to the freedom as non-domination of certain individuals.” Philip Pettit,
Republican Freedom and Contestatory Democratization, in DEMOCRACY’S VALUE 163, 178 (Ian
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tend to stress two harms, each sounding in political inequality. The first
is that the majority may discriminate against a vulnerable minority
group or interest.282 The second is that the majority will find a way to
entrench its own power, thus cutting off the democratic process.283
Professor John Hart Ely prominently expounded on both of these
problems, antidiscrimination and entrenchment, as justifications for
representation-reinforcing judicial review.284
My aim here is simply to underscore how contingent the risk is. In
state institutions and beyond, we should indeed focus on the goal of
political equality.285 But we should not treat majority rule as its

Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordón eds., 1999). For Pettit, this threat necessitates a form of
“contestatory democracy” in which the minority group has a form of power—weaker than a veto
power, but the power to be heard on an impartial basis, through adjudication, consultation, or a
similar method. Id. at 179–80.
282. Some version of this theme runs through the Supreme Court’s equal protection cases,
see, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973), as well as the writings
of a wide range of democracy and constitutional scholars, from John Stuart Mill, see JOHN
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 20 (1956) (describing “the tyranny of the majority” as “among the
evils against which society requires to be on its guard”), to GUINIER, supra note 277, at 9 (“The
history of struggle against tyrannical majorities enlightens us to the dangers of winner-take-all
collective decision[-]making.”).
283. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups
of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 646–51 (1998); see also Daryl Levinson &
Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. 400, 406 (2015) (noting
that in the field of election law, “scholars have increasingly viewed the entrenchment of
incumbent officeholders, political parties, and majority coalitions as the central problem that legal
regulation of the political process should be designed to solve”).
284. On antidiscrimination, see ELY, supra note 35, at 103 (identifying one form of
democratic dysfunction as that in which “representatives beholden to an effective majority are
systematically disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal to
recognize commonalities of interest, and thereby denying that minority the protection afforded
other groups by a representative system”) and United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that “more exacting judicial scrutiny” may be required for “prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities”). On entrenchment, see ELY, supra note 35, at 103
(identifying another democratic dysfunction as occurring when “the ins are choking off the
channels of political change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out”) and
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (raising the possibility of more searching scrutiny for
“legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring
about repeal of undesirable legislation”). See also Pamela S. Karlan, John Hart Ely and the
Problem of Gerrymandering: The Lion in Winter, 114 YALE L.J. 1329, 1331 (2005) (describing the
two rationales of Ely’s approach as “anti-entrenchment and . . . antidiscrimination”).
285. In advocating political equality as an independent value of democracy, not a mere
scaffold of majoritarianism, this account is thus not purely Elysian. Rather, as Professor Jane
Schacter has argued, Ely’s process theory is most normatively appealing “at a high level of
abstraction,” in which it stands for the idea that “animus and hierarchy” are at odds with true
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necessary antagonist. The threats of discrimination and entrenchment
attend the exercise of power, not the exercise of majority power.
Indeed, a different and opposing intellectual tradition shows that the
same harms to political equality might as easily occur—and be worse,
democratically—when minority interests hold outsized power.286 At
any given time—and especially in our time—outsized minority power
may pose an equal or greater risk of discrimination or entrenchment.
We should reject a vocabulary that disparages majority rule, or the
state institutions that prioritize it, by binding them to political
inequality.
1. Discrimination. To play out the analysis further, consider first
how both majority and minority power are linked to the problem of
discrimination, which typically focuses on groups that are sufficiently
“politically powerless” that they cannot simply protect their interests
in the political process.287 In a system of effective pluralist competition,
the risk would be less concerning: the loser of one round of political
competition can “wheel and deal”288 like everyone else and might well
prevail the next time.289 But as Ely noted and others have since
underscored, not all groups participate in this competition on equal
terms.290
It might be, as the line of thought fearing majority excess
emphasizes, that majorities are the ones inflicting discriminatory

“democratic citizenship.” Jane S. Schacter, Ely at the Altar: Political Process Theory Through the
Lens of the Marriage Debate, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1363, 1369 (2011) [hereinafter Schacter, Ely at
the Altar].
286. As Professor Neil Komesar has observed in documenting both “majoritarian bias” and
“minoritarian bias,” “[a]t various times and by various parties, one or the other of these
conceptions has been envisioned as the sole or paramount evil,” but “both . . . are viable
representations of serious political malfunction.” Neil K. Komesar, A Job for the Judges: The
Judiciary and the Constitution in a Massive and Complex Society, 86 MICH. L. REV. 657, 671
(1988).
287. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 25; id. at 121 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For a theory of what
this term means, see Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Political Powerlessness, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1527, 1545 (2015).
288. ELY, supra note 35, at 84.
289. See, e.g., id.; ROBERT DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 24
(1967).
290. See ELY, supra note 35, at 135 (describing literature emphasizing “the undeniable
concentration of power, and inequalities among the various competing groups, in American
politics”).
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treatment.291 Indeed, examples of discrimination by majorities at the
national level are all too familiar. From the persecution of Native
Americans292 to the internment of Japanese Americans293 to the
repeated government actions marginalizing Black Americans,294 our
history is replete with examples of majority discrimination against
politically disadvantaged groups—instances of oppression that cannot
be chalked up to one-offs or to the failure of government to channel
majority will.
But discrimination against the politically powerless is not a
problem caused by majorities alone. The U.S. government has not
refuted the fears of many anti-federalists and others—that the
Constitution would do too little to avoid aristocracy295 and that the new
government would stray too far from the will of the people.296 Both in
history and today, many of the nation’s most shameful acts were not
carried out by numerical majorities.297 In discussing the atrocities of Jim
Crow, for example, “we should not forget that into the late nineteenth
century [Black persons] continued to constitute a majority of the
population in three southern states and hundreds of [B]lack [B]elt
counties, and were not far from majority status in several other
southern states.”298 And extensive social science research supports the
291.
292.

See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
See generally CLAUDIO SAUNT, UNWORTHY REPUBLIC: THE DISPOSSESSION OF
NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE ROAD TO INDIAN TERRITORY (2020) (documenting the forced
migration of Native Americans during the 1830s).
293. Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA.
L. REV. 1, 28–29 (1996) (describing the widespread support for the policy of Japanese exclusion
and internment).
294. Beyond the atrocities of Jim Crow, discussed below, the federal and state governments
have participated in racial discrimination in subtler ways. See, e.g., RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE
COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED
AMERICA, at vii–viii (2018).
295. See Jean Yarbrough, Representation and Republicanism: Two Views, 9 PUBLIUS 77, 77,
85, 88 (1979).
296. To be sure, the anti-federalists did not all speak with one voice. See SAUL CORNELL,
THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA,
1788–1828, at 9 (1999).
297. See Blackhawk, supra note 277, at 1797 n.32 (emphasizing a focus on “minorities who
have been historically subordinated, marginalized, and racialized by those in power, even when
their numbers don’t necessarily place them in the status of a numerical minority”).
298. Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV.
747, 804 (1991); Gabriel J. Chin & Randy Wagner, The Tyranny of the Minority: Jim Crow and
the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 66 (2008) (“In the darkest
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idea that it is elite or affluent minorities, not majorities, who wield
outsized power,299 to the point that “[a]t every stage of the electoral
and governing process, wealthy Americans dominate.”300 Critics warn
that “a political system that responds to the policy preferences of
wealthy individuals and well-funded interest groups, rather than to
those of most voters, is not a democracy.”301
The majoritarian state institutions that are this Article’s focus
illustrate the weakness of the link between majority rule and
discrimination. To be sure, these institutions may effectuate
discrimination. The ballot initiative process has received particular
criticism for this. In a well-known article in the 1970s, Professor
Derrick Bell identified discrimination as a pathology of direct
democracy, using state and local examples from the context of lowincome housing.302 He argued that unlike the legislative process, which
imposes the moderating forces of publicity and political compromise,
direct lawmaking, completed “in the privacy of the voting booth,” lacks
“restraint on racial passions” and fosters bias.303 Other scholars have

days of Jim Crow, African Americans were a minority nationally, but were a majority in the states
where their population was most highly concentrated.”).
299. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 724
(1985) (arguing that, contra Ely, it is diffuse majorities that are “systematically disadvantaged in
a pluralist democracy”). More recently, see, for example, GANESH SITARAMAN, THE GREAT
DEMOCRACY: HOW TO FIX OUR POLITICS, UNRIG THE ECONOMY, AND UNITE AMERICA 6
(2019) (describing “nationalist oligarchy”); see also K. SABEEL RAHMAN & HOLLIE RUSSON
GILMAN, CIVIC POWER: REBUILDING AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN AN ERA OF CRISIS 5–7 (2020)
(describing how the outsized power of business interests and wealthy constituencies threatens
democracy).
300. Andrias & Sachs, supra note 12, at 562; see also RAHMAN & GILMAN, supra note 299, at
5 (“An extensive social science literature has in recent years documented more pervasive
disparities in how public policy skews toward the preferences of wealthier and more elite
constituencies.”); see also BENJAMIN I. PAGE & MARTIN GILENS, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA?:
WHAT HAS GONE WRONG AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 16 (2017) (“Ordinary citizens
have little or no influence on public policy, while affluent and wealthy Americans and organized
interest groups—especially business groups—often get their way.”).
301. Klarman, Foreword, supra note 1, at 209.
302. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy’s Barrier to Racial Equality, 54
WASH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1978) (“[T]he growing reliance on the referendum and initiative poses a
threat to individual rights in general and in particular creates a crisis for the rights of racial and
other discrete minorities.”).
303. Id. at 14–15 (“Ironically, because it enables the voters’ racial beliefs and fears to be
recorded and tabulated in their pure form, the referendum has been a most effective facilitator of
that bias, discrimination, and prejudice which has marred American democracy from its earliest
day.”).
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echoed Bell’s concern for abuses of the initiative process, particularly
in the context of measures abridging LGBTQ rights.304 Some empirical
work points in the same direction. Professor Barbara Gamble found,
for example, that certain initiatives limiting minority rights passed at
higher rates than other initiatives.305
But the link is not entirely clear. Professor John Matsusaka has
categorized the 2609 initiatives that made the ballot over the last one
hundred years and concluded that only 1.8 percent of these proposals
would have discriminated against minority populations, and that the
vast majority of these either failed at the ballot box or were invalidated
by courts.306 Related, Professor Douglas Reed’s theory of popular
constitutionalism in the states observes that on divisive issues,
mobilizations are often met by countermobilizations in the states, such
that neither an initiative nor the ruling of an elected court is the final
word.307 And the fact that most ballot initiatives on any topic either do
not pass or are overturned (and many more are diluted)308 blunts the
critique of majority tyranny.309 For at least some ballot initiative
campaigns, a stronger argument against is that they may become a tool
of an affluent minority interest that can discriminate against diffuse
majorities.310 Moreover, ballot initiatives may also work to overturn

304. See Schacter, Ely at the Altar, supra note 285, at 1395 (“All in all, direct democracy has
been a formidable force in blocking gay rights measures.”).
305. Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 258
(1997). But see Todd Donovan & Shaun Bowler, Direct Democracy and Minority Rights: An
Extension, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1020, 1022–23 (1998) (describing limitations of Gamble’s study and
noting the difficulty in discerning whether similar measures would have passed through
representative democracy).
306. MATSUSAKA, supra note 116, at 209.
307. Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism: Toward a Theory of State Constitutional
Meanings, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 871, 875–76 (1999).
308. ELIZABETH R. GERBER, ARTHUR LUPIA, MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS & D. RODERICK
KIEWIET, STEALING THE INITIATIVE: HOW STATE GOVERNMENT RESPONDS TO DIRECT
DEMOCRACY 4 (2001).
309. See generally DANIEL A. SMITH & CAROLINE J. TOLBERT, EDUCATED BY INITIATIVE:
THE EFFECTS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY ON CITIZENS AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE
AMERICAN STATES (2004) (arguing that while most initiatives fail or are judicially rejected, they
may play an important role in educating voters on topics like civic engagement).
310. See Gerstein, supra note 217 (arguing that California’s Proposition 22, Cal. Prop. 22
(2021), reflected the influence of wealthy corporations rather than the will of the general public).

SEIFTER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

DEMOCRATIC OPPORTUNITY

10/16/2022 11:35 AM

335

discrimination that state legislatures—which may be minoritarian
institutions—imposed or failed to address.311
The same uncertain link between majoritarian power and
discrimination plays out in the context of gubernatorial power. Like
executive power more broadly, gubernatorial power receives criticism
for fostering discrimination against minority populations.312 A
recurring refrain during the COVID-19 pandemic was that governors
were running roughshod over civil liberties, including those of religious
groups.313 Outside the pandemic context, some governors have used
their office to discriminate against LGBTQ persons and immigrants.314
But the opposite dynamic also holds. Other governors expand rights
and liberties rather than contract them, emphasizing again that
majoritarian institutions might facilitate rather than undermine
minority protection.315 And, again, other examples of discrimination
have come from state legislatures, which are sometimes
gerrymandered and minoritarian.316 In short, the behavior and output
of institutions depends on political, social, and other contextual
factors—not on a straight line between majorities and oppression.
2. Entrenchment and Other Problems. The second problem often
pinned to majority rule, and thus implicated in critiques of state
majoritarian institutions, is entrenchment. This idea, too, has a long
and continuing pedigree. Majorities may entrench their own power in

311. See supra note 125 (referencing initiatives creating redistricting commissions and
expanding voting rights); see also MATSUSAKA, supra note 116, at 208–10 (analyzing the success
of minority-related ballot initiatives over time).
312. Cf. David Froomkin & Ian Shapiro, The New Authoritarianism in Public Choice, POL.
STUD., Aug. 4, 2021, at 16 (pushing back against “the new authoritarians” who favor increased
executive power as a solution to the pathologies of legislatures).
313. See, e.g., Frances Stead Sellers & Isaac Stanley-Becker, As Coronavirus Surges, GOP
Lawmakers Are Moving To Limit Public Health Powers, WASH. POST (July 25, 2021, 6:05 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/gop-legislatures-health-laws/2021/07/25/2455940c-db5
4-11eb-8fb8-aea56b785b00_story.html [https://perma.cc/KU5N-C2Y4].
314. See Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, supra note 106, at 486, 502.
315. See id.
316. For example, bills that would discriminate against transgender students have been
introduced in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania. See S.B. 218, 101st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich.
2021); H.B. 972, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2021); A.B. 196, 2021–22 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Wis. 2021).
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various ways so that democracy will no longer be a fair contest.317 The
majority in power now might thwart the wishes of voters today or in
the future in ways that are ultimately both antimajoritarian and
unfair.318 Our long history of egregious malapportionment,319
addressed in the Supreme Court’s reapportionment cases,320 has given
way today to extreme partisan gerrymandering under which voters can
scarcely hold legislatures accountable.321
At the state level, majoritarian institutions might indeed attempt
such entrenchment—and, as I argue below, should be constrained
when they try. In some cases, though, these may not truly be
majoritarian efforts. Power grabs during lame duck sessions, for
example, lack the imprimatur of the just-elected governor; judicial
rulings may reflect the views of a court about to change hands; and
ballot initiatives might confuse voters rather than empower them. State
legislatures, tainted by prior gerrymanders, may not be majoritarian
after all.
The same fears of entrenchment apply, even more clearly, when
minority interests or parties hold sway. A minority that claims power
is even more likely to attempt to cement that power through
entrenchment techniques. This is part of the “authoritarian
playbook.”322 Once a minority party manages to seize power, its object
is to retain it.323
Indeed, much of the behavior afoot in the states raises the specter
of minoritarian entrenchment. In several of the examples,
gerrymandered state legislatures dominated by a minority party seek

317. See ELY, supra note 35, at 103; United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938).
318. See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85
GEO. L.J. 491, 498 (1997).
319. See, e.g., STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & JAMES M. SNYDER, JR., THE END OF
INEQUALITY: ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS
34–37 (Ira Katznelson ed., 2008).
320. Karlan, supra note 284, at 1333 (“Nothing provides a better model of anti-entrenchment
judicial review than the Warren Court’s reapportionment cases.”).
321. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2509 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
322. E.g., Klarman, Foreword, supra note 1, at 11.
323. See LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 1, at 87–88; see also James A. Gardner, The
Illiberalization of American Election Law: A Study in Democratic Deconsolidation, 90 FORDHAM
L. REV. 423, 432 (2021) (describing democratic backsliding as entailing a party “gradually
entrenching itself in power through anti-democratic means”).
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to undermine the majoritarian status of the governor, the courts, or the
ballot initiative. In other examples, an extreme partisan faction seeks
to introduce measures that would foreclose a future fair election and
install a minoritarian winner.
Finally, beyond the signal harms of discrimination and
entrenchment, majority rule may also be flawed in less devastating
ways—but these, too, may apply to minority decision-making.
Majorities may make poor decisions due to inadequate deliberation or
groupthink.324 They might overlook solutions that would be
satisfactory to all.325 But again, there is no reason to believe, and to my
knowledge no suggestion, that simply switching the decision maker
from the majority to the minority would solve these problems.
*

*

*

The lines of argument I have reprised here are clearly not new.
But placing them together should go some way toward dispensing with
the misleading rhetoric that majority rule, in general or in state
institutions, is the core threat to political equality. Depending on the
underlying power dynamics and the type of constraint imposed, any
given reform might alleviate political inequality or cause it. This
ambiguity may generate conflict, but at least it will be conflict on
fruitful terms—terms that inquire into context and jettison blanket
denouncements of majority or minority power.
B. Tailoring Solutions to Problems
If maligning majority rule across the board will not work, how can
we evaluate constraints on it? In the realm of constitutional rights,
courts and commentators recognize the importance of distinguishing
between those rights that are vital (or “fundamental”) and those that
are not, including those that matter because of their import to a
functional democracy. To my knowledge, we have no similar
vocabulary for structure. Perhaps that is because, at the federal level,

324. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Group Dynamics, 12 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE
129, 130–34 (2000).
325. See, e.g., PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY AND
MODEL OF DEMOCRACY 211–15 (2012) (discussing circumstances in which modifying simple
majority rule by allowing contestation improves decision-making).
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most structural features are either unchanging (like the Senate)326 or
nonjusticiable (like partisan gerrymandering).327 But of course, not all
changes to majoritarian institutions impose equivalent burdens on
majority rule. What we need is structural tailoring: a way of separating
problematic incursions from harmless ones.
This framework recognizes that majoritarian institutions need not
remain static. Reforms are often salutary—but which reforms, and in
what circumstances? To evaluate, it makes sense to consider both the
degree of new constraint imposed and the reason for imposing it. A
constraint may be “weak” or “strong,” a distinction I develop below.
The strongest constraints require more compelling justifications. And,
in a subset of recurring cases, constraints should fail when they are
more likely to cause or exacerbate political inequality than to alleviate
it.
As a preliminary manner, all majoritarian institutions already face
one constraint that is not in question here: the constraint of state and
federal constitutional rights. An overreaching governor or ballot
initiative, for example, is already limited by the individual rights and
liberties that the state and national constitutions confer. The analysis
that follows, then, goes beyond Ely’s concern for the intervention of
allegedly countermajoritarian courts.328 Rather, it regards majority
constraints as potentially harmful even when they do not manifest as
judicially created rights and allows evaluation of the many proposals to
further limit state majoritarian institutions through structural change.
Sometimes there will be easy cases. It would be useful progress to
agree upon even this set. By way of thought experiment, imagine that
a majority party expecting to lose the next election passes a statute
providing that the party receiving fewer votes in that election will take
control of Congress. Such a scheme plainly flouts the principles of

326. See Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional
Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 719–20 (2011).
327. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507 (2019).
328. The approach expressed here might still align with Ely’s normative underpinnings if one
reads his work as requiring “fair majoritarianism” or even a robust version of political equality,
rather than mere majority rule. For articulation of these possible readings, see Jane S. Schacter,
Ely and the Idea of Democracy, 57 STAN. L. REV. 737, 741–42 (2004).
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political equality329 and majority rule.330 It directly hands power to the
electoral loser and gives the minority party outsized power in the
political process. It also represents the sort of bald-faced entrenchment
that conventional wisdom rejects as unconstitutional.331 Simply put,
replacing majority rule with full-blown minority-party rule is not an
acceptable solution in a democracy.332 Perhaps surprisingly, some
recent proposals approach this sort of complete inversion, as I explain
in Part III.C.
In most cases, the proposal will not be a complete imposition of
minority-party rule. How, then, to evaluate? The degree of the
constraint and justification for it should be useful guides.
1. A Spectrum of Constraints. Majority constraints vary. It makes
sense to imagine them as falling along a spectrum, from weak to strong
constraints. Generally speaking, weak constraints are normatively
unproblematic and can enrich majority decision-making without
undermining democracy, whereas strong constraints require greater
scrutiny and justification.
What makes a constraint weak or strong? Three variables,
although not exclusive, are telling. A constraint might be outcomedeterminative or merely influential. It might be general (spanning
subject areas) or specific. And it might be durable (spanning one or
more full election cycles) or time-limited (for a single vote or set of
votes). The strongest constraints are outcome determinative, general,
and long-lasting—like the Congress example above. The weakest
constraints are influential, specific, and time limited. Other

329. See generally Maria Paula Saffon & Nadia Urbinati, Procedural Democracy, the Bulwark
of Equal Liberty, 41 POL. THEORY 441, 442, 460 (2013) (prioritizing “equal liberty—the equal
opportunity to express one’s voice in politics, and the equal weight given to that voice in decision[]making”).
330. See DAHL, PREFACE, supra note 275.
331. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the principle, dating to Blackstone, that
“one legislature may not bind the legislative authority of its successors,” even as the Court has
also recognized limits on that principle. For discussion, see United States v. Winstar Corp., 518
U.S. 839, 872–75 (1996).
332. See generally Levitsky et al., supra note 9 (describing a democratic crisis caused by
entrenched minority rule).
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combinations of these variables will fall on other points in the
spectrum.333
Minimally, we might constrain majority rule by empowering
minorities in ways that influence majority decision-making without
trumping it. Such “submajority rules,” as Professor Adrian Vermeule
terms them, permit a numerical minority “the affirmative power to
change the status quo,”334 while stopping short of allowing minorities
to bind the public with the force of law. The typical examples here
would be procedural, preliminary, or agenda-setting decisions.335 The
concept of influence itself entails a spectrum. A brief or perfunctory
consultation is different from the requirement of extended meetings or
from a series of merely influential steps that cumulatively ossify a
decision-making process. Generally speaking, weak constraints can be
conjured and imposed creatively, with attention to the growing
literature on ways that affording power, and not just rights, to minority
populations may both serve their interests and enrich the ultimate
decisions.336
Proceeding further along the spectrum, a majority constraint
might allow some minority entity to exercise outcome-determinative
power, but in an isolated fashion. This resembles the sort of limit
imposed by individual rights—which of course would still apply under
this analysis—but through structure. The power afforded might be
limited to a particular issue. It might provide, for example, that a
minority party is authorized to veto certain emergency orders imposed
by the executive (as I describe in Part III.C, some recent legislation
does this). Or it might be limited over time—as when a minority

333. For an illuminating discussion of how rights and forms of structural power differ along
similar variables, see Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 YALE L.J. 1286, 1324–49 (2012).
While Levinson accurately describes rights as “typically” affording a narrower set of interests with
stronger protection, id. at 1348–49, and voting power as generally offering broader but less certain
protection, id. at 1349, the discussion above indicates that this generalization might not always
hold: both rights and voting power can be designed to be more or less outcome determinative and
more or less broad.
334. Adrian Vermeule, Submajority Rules: Forcing Accountability upon Majorities, 13 J. POL.
PHIL. 74, 74 (2005).
335. See id. See generally JENNIFER HAYES CLARK, MINORITY PARTIES IN U.S. LEGISLATURES:
CONDITIONS OF INFLUENCE (2015) (studying the influence minority parties wield in the
legislative process).
336. See Blackhawk, supra note 277, at 1863–66; Levinson, supra note 333, at 1332–33.
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population is authorized to “take turns” making decisions.337 Again,
these possibilities entail spectrums within the spectrum. How
expansive is the “specific” issue that the minority may decide—all
emergency powers, or just an aspect of them? And how frequently
might the minority take a “turn” in governing? The stronger the
constraint, the better reason for it there ought to be.
A variation on this theme is what Professor David Fontana terms
“government in opposition” rules, in which the party that loses an
election exercises some of “the power to govern.”338 This “unnoticed
innovation in constitutional form”339 exists in different versions around
the world. For example, losing parties might control the legislature for
certain days of the year or chair legislative committees, hold cabinet
positions in parliamentary systems, and appoint judges or have special
standing in litigation.340 Advocating more of this approach in the
United States, Fontana proposes that during (but only during) unified
partisan government, the winning political party should be legally
obligated to negotiate with the losing party. In turn, the minority party
would control, “at minimum, some significant . . . number of important
cabinet positions, chairmanships of important congressional
committees, and the ability to nominate a certain number of federal
judges.”341
Finally, the strongest constraints on majority rule would invert it
altogether. In addition to the flagrant Congress example introduced at
the outset,342 extremely gerrymandered legislatures arguably fit in this
category. An electoral scheme that allows a party to govern despite
receiving fewer votes—as has happened numerous times in state

337. See GUINIER, supra note 277, at 5.
338. David Fontana, Government in Opposition, 119 YALE L.J. 548, 556–57 (2009). Fontana
defines “[t]he power to govern” as “the capacity to use the sovereign power of the state to order
and coerce binding, obligatory endeavors.” Id. at 556. Examples include “controlling the agenda
of a committee or of a legislature, or enacting statutes, or controlling a panel of judges that will
issue a binding decision.” Id. As Fontana notes, the government in opposition model shares some
common ground with, but stops short of, political scientist Arend Lijphart’s model of
“consociational democracy.” Id. at 565. See generally Arend Lijphart, Consociational Democracy,
21 WORLD POL. 207 (1969) (outlining a set of approaches in which groups share power to create
stability in fragmented democracies).
339. Fontana, supra note 338, at 564.
340. See id. at 571–81.
341. Id. at 601 (emphasis removed).
342. See supra p. 338.
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legislatures in the modern era—does not cross the basic threshold of
majority rule, however common the practice may become.343
2. Evaluating Justifications. Under the approach I propose,
stronger constraints on majority rule require greater justification,
typically one sounding in existing discrimination or entrenchment. This
approach obviously leaves room for close cases and debate, as it
should, and will not resolve every conflict. But antidemocratic actors
have recently offered three types of proposals based on justifications
that are mistaken or misleading. Each warrants discussion.
First, as alluded to above, some actors have attempted to leverage
a problem, serious or otherwise, as a justification for eliminating
majority rule altogether. But creating sustained, institution-wide
minority rule is not an acceptable solution, even to actual excesses of a
majority. Avoiding the problem of elite minority bias is part of the
value of majority rule in the first place.344 Note that all of the extant
majority constraints discussed above stop short of true inversions.
Rights afford protection that is decisive, but only on certain topics.
Submajority rules, turn-taking, and government-in-opposition rules all
allow majorities to wield political power, but not comprehensively or
at an institution-wide level. The majority constraints that are
normatively attractive do not overturn majority rule.
The second problematic proposal would implement a strong
majority constraint based merely on dissatisfaction with a political loss.
For example, if a ballot initiative disadvantages a group that is perfectly
capable of competing in the political process, a strong, outcomedeterminative remedy creates a mismatch. The goal of majority
constraint is not to eliminate the phenomenon of politically powerful
numerical minorities losing. A powerful minority requires no
additional protection from majority rule; it can already compete in the
“pluralist bazaar.”345

343. See Seifter, Countermajoritarian Legislatures, supra note 27, at 1755–68.
344. See Ian Shapiro, Three Fallacies Concerning Majorities, Minorities, and Democratic
Politics, in MAJORITIES AND MINORITIES: NOMOS XXXII, supra note 281, at 79–80.
345. For a discussion of how democratic principles may limit efforts to protect minority
interests, see Levinson, supra note 333, at 1332–33 (“[T]here may be a fine line between making
minorities politically powerful enough to protect their core interests and making them too
powerful, putting them in a position to extract more than their fair share or undermining the
workability of democratic governance.” (emphasis removed)).
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Third, purported reformers may propose reforms that they claim
would alleviate political equality but that in fact would create it. In
these cases, the purported reformer alleges that a majoritarian
institution has gone too far in infringing individual liberty or equality.
But the proposed reform would shift power to a minority group or
party that already wields outsized power and/or away from a majority
that already faces a substantial headwind.
This third category of mistaken majority constraint may be the
hardest to detect, but certain features may signal its potential presence.
In particular, laws or decisions that expand the power of
gerrymandered legislatures may be red flags. Similarly, it is worth
scrutinizing measures that give a strong veto power to minority
political parties in closely divided states. Closely divided states feature
distinct power dynamics346: both the temptation for power grabs and
the stakes for potential entrenchment are higher than in consistently
lopsided states.347 Accordingly, shifting structural power in a closely
divided state is likely to give the minority party a greater windfall than
in a lopsided state; depending on the reform at issue, such a power shift
(such as the ability to appoint judges or control election
administration) may give the minority party not just the power to
govern temporarily, but a greater likelihood of winning the next
election.
C. Classifying the State-Level Attacks
The developments in Part II do not fare well—but do not all fare
the same—under the framework sketched above. Moreover, even
when developments do not appear problematic individually or in
isolation, they may be part of a broader pattern of whittling away that
will undermine state democratic opportunity.
Before categorizing the developments, one dilemma warrants
attention. If majoritarian institutions are so important, and they have
enacted some of Part II’s developments, why not let their outputs ride?
Or, to approach the problem from the other side, if majoritarian
institutions reached the decisions in Part II, why value them so highly?

346. On the ways that close division shapes politics, see, for example, LEE, supra note 10, at
3–5.
347. See Gould & Pozen, supra note 16, at 89–90 (“Intense competition between the parties
encourages the seeking of any possible advantage, including the use of structural biases for
purposes of entrenching one’s own reforms or disrupting the other side’s agenda.”).
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A partial answer is that not all of Part II’s developments appear
genuinely majoritarian. Some, such as Pennsylvania’s judicial
districting, are mere proposals (and would bypass the governor).
Others, such as the statutes in Ohio and Kentucky, were passed as veto
overrides. Still others, such as the recent proposals in Michigan,
sidestep the governor’s role altogether.
But some proposals, including initiative restrictions in Idaho and
elsewhere, have passed through bicameralism and presentment. As to
those, democratic opportunity provides a guiding principle. In
advocating the protection of democratic opportunity, this Article’s
position, aligned with the prevailing view in democratic theory, is that
even majoritarian institutions must not foreclose or abolish
democracy.348 State majoritarian institutions do not promise wisdom at
any given moment, but we count on them to continue to allow
majorities to rule.
That brings us to the proposals themselves. First, some proposals
resemble the most flagrant problem, that of imposing a full inversion
of majority rule. Judicial gerrymandering in Pennsylvania could have
that effect or at least seems designed to do so. If successful and if
designed like Pennsylvania’s gerrymandered legislative districts, it
could yield minority-party control of the judiciary.349 The effect in
Montana is more subtle because it does not track party lines (and the
state supreme court’s elections are nonpartisan), but its effect may be
to shift power of the state’s high court from a more moderate majority
to a less moderate minority within the state.350
Other proposals involve a stark mismatch between the extent of
the constraint and the given justification, imposing a strong constraint
in the absence of a compelling justification or any democratic
malfunction. The Idaho ballot initiative restriction is a leading
example. There, recall, the signature requirement added to the ballot
initiative process would have been the most stringent in the nation,
requiring a threshold number of signatures from all of the state’s 35
348. For expressions of this view and explorations of its limits, see, for example, Samuel
Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405, 1408–14 (2007) and Jan-Werner
Müller, Protecting Popular Self-Government from the People? New Normative Perspectives on
Militant Democracy, 19 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 249, 251–58 (2016).
349. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
350. For background, see John S. Adams, Emails Uncover Acrimony in GOP, GREAT FALLS
TRIB., Jan. 16, 2013, at A1.
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legislative districts.351 The requirement would have made qualifying an
initiative for the ballot exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. As the
Idaho Supreme Court put it in striking down the initiative, “[i]f the
Legislature’s actual goal is to prevent any initiative or referendum from
qualifying for the ballot, then this is probably an effective tactic.”352 In
supporting the restriction, the state legislature argued that the
restriction was needed to avoid majority excess—that it “creates a
check on the will of the majority”353 and “was necessary to prevent the
minority from being ‘trammeled by the majority.’”354
But the mismatch was plain. Making all ballot initiatives
impossible or nearly impossible is a very strong form of majority
constraint. So is giving any single district complete veto power of an
initiative with broad support.355 These types of constraints ought to
have strong justifications, but the legislature identified none, other
than the vague notion, described in Part III.A, that majority rule is a
threat to minorities.
The Supreme Court’s reasoning, although situated in a rights
framework, tracked this logic. The Court noted “an unmistakable
pattern by the legislature of constricting the people’s initiative and
referendum powers after they successfully use it.”356 It noted the
legislature’s argument regarding majorities trammeling minorities and
the resonance with Federalist 10. But, the Court observed, the
legislature had shown no actual discrimination against any minority
interest, past or present:
In short, they have failed to demonstrate how minority rights have
been “trammeled” by the initiative process in Idaho. It is difficult to

351. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
352. Reclaim Idaho v. Denney, 497 P.3d 160, 191 (Idaho 2021).
353. Id. at 188 (quoting respondents’ brief).
354. Id. at 186 (quoting oral argument).
355. As the court put it:
[T]he Legislature has essentially given every legislative district veto power over
qualifying initiatives and referenda for the ballot. While this might theoretically assure
that voters with minority interests will have a voice, it will achieve this end at a terrible
cost. For example, a lone urban district in Boise could thwart an agricultural initiative
with strong statewide support. Likewise, a paid special interest lobby could derail a
popular initiative it dislikes by focusing its opposition efforts on a single legislative
district with which it shares common interests.
Id. at 190.
356. Id. at 186.
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find . . . a realistic threat that the interests of any group of Idaho
citizens are currently at risk due to the initiative process previously in
effect when (1) so few initiatives or referenda have even qualified for
the ballot in the last 109 years, and (2) the legislature still possesses
the authority to repeal initiatives once passed, as they have done
before. In fact, no actual or perceived threat to minority interests
necessitating [Senate Bill] 1110’s signature requirement has been
identified by the legislature. The most recent examples—the
referenda overturning the “Luna Laws” in 2012 and the Medicaid
Expansion initiative in 2018—actually may have been examples of the
majority of Idaho voters acting in a democratic fashion to protect
minority interests (educators and the poor) when the Idaho
Legislature would not.357

Not all limitations on the ballot initiative will fail under this
analysis. As earlier discussion indicated, ballot initiatives may well
harm minority-group interests,358 though it is unclear how much greater
this risk is compared to ordinary legislation. Still, a range of reforms
short of strong constraints could mitigate the risk of harm to vulnerable
groups. A few states exclude some civil rights questions from the
initiative process altogether.359 The concern that voters do not
understand the initiatives they are voting on could readily support
additional attempts at voter education, deliberation-forcing measures,
or the requirement of multiple votes.360
Finally, the recent limits on the powers of governors and other
executive branch actors span the spectrum, both in terms of the
strength of the constraint imposed and their normative defensibility.
At one end of the spectrum, provisions requiring governors to consult
with others or to engage in a notice and comment process before
wielding certain emergency powers may be innocuous; these qualify as
weak constraints with no necessary democratic harm. At the other end
357. Id. at 187 (emphasis in original).
358. See supra notes 302–305 and accompanying text.
359. See Todd Donovan, Direct Democracy and Campaigns Against Minorities, 97 MINN. L.
REV. 1730, 1778–79, 1779 n.301 (2013) (discussing Mississippi and Massachusetts as examples and
noting that Mississippi’s exclusions could also prevent expansions of civil rights). Mississippi does
not have an initiative process at present due to Initiative Measure No. 65: Mayor Butler v. Watson,
338 So. 3d 599 (Miss. 2021).
360. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, 52 BOOK OF STATES 8 (2020), https://issuu.com/
csg.publications/docs/bos_2020_web [https://perma.cc/9V8S-GC27] (showing twelve states that
require two rounds of approval for constitutional amendments).
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of the spectrum, several of the shifts of election administration away
from majoritarian institutions raise serious democratic concern. Not
only do many of these transfer power from majoritarian entities to less
majoritarian entities, but they do so in ways that seem designed to
imperil the ability of voters to select their representatives.361
Other gubernatorial constraints must be considered in context.
Some shifts will prove unproblematic on democratic grounds because,
once examined, they do not entail a strong constraint at all. For
example, there is little impact on majority rule if the legislature
imposing the constraint is not heavily gerrymandered and/or is part of
the same political party as the governor in a state where the party’s
politics are fairly cohesive and aligned with the electorate. Other shifts
will appear neutral but will impose strong constraints in effect. For
example, while requiring gubernatorial orders to go through a noticeand-comment process is typically a soft constraint, the Wisconsin
decision requiring that step operated as a functional veto due to
Republican control of the legislative committee overseeing
rulemaking.362 That sort of strong constraint required a compelling
justification under this framework, beyond the blanket recitations of
the legislature as the voice of the people. Finally, while this Article’s
focus is on horizontal allocations of power within state government,
measures like Ohio’s have implications for democracy at the local level.
By imposing strong constraints on local decision-making, such
measures preclude the power that decentralization otherwise affords
to groups that may be statewide minorities but are local majorities.363
Even constraints that appear benign in isolation might be part of
a normatively problematic cumulative effect. If states whittle away at
majoritarian institutions, even if apparently justified or debatable in
the moment, we may wind up with less democratic opportunity and
fewer counterweights against national minoritarianism. This caution is
admittedly difficult to cash out into a specific prescription. It would be
overblown to suggest that, in light of national trends, every state
institution must be left in its precise present majoritarian form. But as
the next Part argues, state courts, state officials, and state-level
361. See generally Hasen, supra note 8 (describing potential threats to future U.S. elections).
362. See Molly Beck, Tony Evers’ Proposal To Replace Stay-at-Home Order Rejected by
GOP Lawmaker with Veto Power, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (May 17, 2020, 2:10 PM),
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/2020/05/15/tony-evers-proposal-replace-stay-homeorder-rejected/5199935002 [https://perma.cc/8DD3-9AVR].
363. See, e.g., Gerken, Federalism, supra note 24, at 46.
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organizers can all put a thumb on the scale in favor of democracy in
close cases.
IV. SAVING STATE DEMOCRATIC OPPORTUNITY
This Article has so far argued that states offer distinctive
democratic opportunity that federal institutions do not, that state
majoritarian institutions are under attack, that many of these attacks
are individually questionable, and that the overall pattern of these
attacks is very concerning. What can be done?
A. The Democracy Principle in State Courts
State courts will continue to adjudicate a wide range of disputes
involving changes to majoritarian institutions. These courts should
heed the state constitutional commitment to the democracy principle—
that is, to popular rule by the people on equal terms.364 Although the
principle is always necessarily rooted in each state’s own founding
document and precedents, it is best understood as a shared principle
common to state constitutions.365 Unlike the federal constitution, state
constitutions, through their often extensive text, expressly and
repeatedly embrace popular sovereignty, majority rule, and popular
equality.366 State constitutional drafters embraced these pillars of
democracy self-consciously, often in response to state or federal
unresponsiveness and through mass interstate practices of mimicry and
“imitative art.”367
In The Democracy Principle in State Constitutions, Professor
Jessica Bulman-Pozen and I outline a series of cases in which the
democracy principle could provide dispositive guidance: cases
involving extreme partisan gerrymandering, lame-duck power grabs,
and legislative reversals of ballot initiatives.368 This Article identifies a
new set of disputes in which the democracy principle ought to apply.

364. See Bulman-Pozen & Seifter, supra note 31, at 861–62.
365. See id. at 908.
366. See id. at 908–09.
367. See id. at 866 (quoting John Walker Mauer, State Constitutions in a Time of Crisis: The
Case of the Texas Constitution of 1876, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1617 (1990)).
368. See id. at 907–32.
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The Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Reclaim Idaho v.
Denney369 is perhaps the best example of how the principle could apply
to antimajoritarian efforts. As Part III details, the Court there began
by identifying express commitments to popular majority rule in the
state constitution. It then devised a framework for reasoning through
whether the state abrogated that commitment, and whether it did so
permissibly.370 Decisions this Article has mentioned from Missouri and
Michigan provide glimpses of similar reasoning, underscoring the
importance of the state’s commitment to democratic principles, and
then finding that the state legislature’s end-run around them was
impermissible.371 As the hundreds of proposals to limit ballot initiatives
make their way to litigation, state high courts would do well to follow
Idaho’s reasoning.
Imagine a similar case involving a shift from majoritarian (or
nonpartisan) to minoritarian partisan election administration, whether
through one of the examples described herein or another yet to come.
Such a dispute provides rich fodder for democracy-principle reasoning.
To be sure, many cases involving administration of elections
themselves will proceed in federal court, and some may involve judicial
resolution of the “independent state legislature” theory.372 But state
courts are free to specify the powers of their legislatures well before
elections occur. It may be that a state constitution’s commitment to
“free and fair” elections and its provision that “all political power is
inherent in the people,” for example,373 tip the balance against a law
creating a patently partisan system of election administration—one
whose architects have embraced a plan to take elections away from the
people themselves.

369. Reclaim Idaho v. Denney, 497 P.3d 160 (Idaho 2021).
370. See supra notes 352–357 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 200–209 and accompanying text.
372. See Hasen, supra note 8, at 284–87 (describing the legal theory’s potential role in election
subversion). The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in a case that addresses the
independent state legislature theory. See Moore v. Harper, 868 S.E.2d 499 (N.C. 2022), cert.
granted, 2022 WL 2347621 (June 30, 2022) (No. 21-1271).
373. See Bulman-Pozen & Seifter, supra note 31, at 869–70 (collecting state constitutional
provisions expressing these commitments).
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B. State Reformers and Organizers
Just as important as how courts ultimately adjudicate conflicts
over the diminishment of state majoritarian institutions is the way that
we talk about these incursions. An extensive interdisciplinary
literature emphasizes the importance of language and framing to public
opinion374 and of public opinion and social movements to the actions of
political and judicial officers.375 A frame provides “a central organizing
idea . . . for making sense of relevant events, suggesting what is at
issue.”376 Attacks on state majoritarian institutions belong within the
frame of democracy—and specifically, as part of the problem of
subverting democracy. The failure of commentators and reformers to
consistently utilize this broader frame and identify state institutions as
counterweights against national democratic decline is a missed
opportunity to increase the likelihood of mobilization and eventual
reform.
Consider three ways that advocacy organizations, reformers, or
commentators might frame a statute or proposition that would
substantially curtail the ballot initiative process. One simply states,
without broader context, that the law would change the number or
distribution of signature requirements for a ballot initiative; this offers
no particular “cultural resonance.”377 Another—the more effective
frame used by proponents of these changes—pitches the law as one

374. See William A. Gamson & Andre Modigliani, Media Discourse and Public Opinion on
Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach, 95 AM. J. SOCIO. 1, 3 (1989) (noting the dialectic
relationship between media discourse and public opinion); Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow,
Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. SOCIO.
611, 626 (2000) (summarizing studies on media framing); ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS
8–16 (1974); see also, e.g., RODGERS, supra note 32, at 3–16 (exploring the political use of and
conflict over certain keywords); Ken I. Kersch, The Talking Cure: How Constitutional Argument
Drives Constitutional Development, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1083, 1088 (2014) (“Political entrepreneurs
and leaders, moreover, can use political and constitutional ideas discursively in popular,
movement, group, and party politics as a vehicle for constitutional renovation and transformation.”).
375. For examples, see Siegel, supra note 32, at 1323 (“Social movement conflict, enabled
and constrained by constitutional culture, can create new forms of constitutional understanding—
a dynamic that guides officials interpreting the open-textured language of the Constitution’s
rights guarantees.”) and Guinier & Torres, supra note 32, at 2803 (“[W]e contend that democratic
societies are organized to produce a variety of authoritative interpretive communities.”).
376. Gamson & Modigliani, supra note 374.
377. See id. at 5 (noting that “[n]ot all symbols are equally potent” and that some framing
efforts “have a natural advantage because their ideas and language resonate with larger cultural
themes”).
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that makes the ballot process more fair, more representative of the
state as a whole, or more protective of minority rights. A third and
preferable approach would point out that burdens on the initiative are
part of a broader attack on democratic opportunity. Without any notes
in this third register, it is hard to see why anyone beyond insiders would
get exercised about the change or why the proponents would feel any
need to change course.378
Who can participate in this reframing? Speaking about state
majoritarian institutions as central to American democracy is an
important task for state officials themselves.379 Many officials in state
government may genuinely want to resolve flaws in judicial elections,
the ballot initiative process, or gubernatorial power. These institutions,
after all, are not perfect. But these reformers should keep in mind
states’ crucial role in democratic opportunity. When considering, for
example, how to address low levels of voter information in ballot
campaigns or a particular overreach by a governor, state officials
should reach for reforms that are incremental, not complete overhauls
or eliminations. And when faced with proposals that would transform
a majoritarian state institution into one that no longer fits that bill, state
officials in opposition should use the language of democracy, not just
object to the proposal’s details.
Organizers outside of state government, too, should take part. The
threat to state-level democracy warrants more attention, with new
vocabulary and priorities for organizers. It is true that organizations
have recently turned more attention to safeguarding state-level
democracy, especially on the specific issue of fair elections.380 But that
turn follows a longer-term, organized effort to gerrymander state
legislatures and, more recently, to undermine state institutions in the
ways described in this Article. And most of the focus in democracy
organizing remains at the federal level.381 There remain myriad

378. See Maisano, supra note 93 (“[F]ailing to address the undemocratic terms of the
constitutional order actually spurs the authoritarian tendencies of the Right . . . .”).
379. See, e.g., Gamson & Modigliani, supra note 374, at 7 (stating that “on most issues, public
officials are often important sponsors” of an effective message).
380. See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text.
381. To take just one example, former government official Miles Taylor’s new group, Renew
America, recently stated that they are “active in congressional races but do[] not have enough
resources to compete in the state contests that often determine election procedures.” David
Leonhardt, America’s Anti-Democratic Movement, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2021), https://www.ny
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pressing issues in the states that receive attention only in a passing news
story, if that.
Finally, using the frame of state democracy might inspire reforms
to protect state democratic opportunity by strengthening the integrity
and competence of state institutions. State legislatures have potential
to be, as the Supreme Court once imagined, “the fountainhead of
representative government in this country.”382 Yet a confluence of
problems has undermined their democratic potential: extreme partisan
gerrymandering,383 resource limitations (including part-time roles and
low pay),384 and a skewed civil society ecosystem that has given an
outsized role to groups such as the American Legislative Exchange
Council.385 These developments help to explain why state legislatures
have proposed many of the most problematic changes this Article
describes. Reformers taking a longer-range view would do well to focus
on democratizing state legislatures.
CONCLUSION
This Article offers a theoretical account of majority rule in the
states—and a normative call to salvage it. State institutions deserve our
attention. These institutions are imperfect, but they tend to privilege
majority rule in a way our national institutions do not. With majority
rule in peril, we should think of states as counterweights to minority
rule and as outlets for majorities to gain footholds as national-level
opportunities wane. It is possible to do this without losing sight of
majority rule’s important limiting principles, including the imperative
for political equality in a democracy. In an era in which our national
institutions are prone to minority rule, the erosion of our state
institutions is too important to ignore.

times.com/2021/12/13/briefing/anti-democratic-movement-us-politics.html [https://perma.cc/DWG5-T
ZJH].
382. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 564 (1964).
383. See Seifter, Countermajoritarian Legislatures, supra note 27, at 1735–36.
384. See Full- and Part-time Legislatures, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (July 28,
2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/full-and-part-time-legislatures.aspx
[https://perma.cc/ZD2J-BR7F].
385. HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, supra note 147, at 209–10.

